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REVERSING REFORM: THE HANDSCHU 
SETTLEMENT IN POST-SEPTEMBER 11 
NEW YORK CITY 
Jerrold L. Steigman* 
Tappin’ my phone, they never leave me alone 
 I’m even lethal when I’m unarmed 
‘Cause I’m louder than a bomb 
 
—Public Enemy1 
INTRODUCTION 
Since September 11, 2001, messages from the government 
and mainstream press have been full of reminders that the world 
has changed.2 Mass hysteria has affected markets, government 
and society. The United States government rushed through 
legislation aimed at deterring further terrorist attacks and 
protecting the country, and rounded up suspects based on 
ethnicity. The words “September 11” became synonymous with 
somber reflection and demanded an etiquette that instantly 
developed. A satirical newspaper wondered if irony was dead.3 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2004; B.S., B.A., Binghamton 
University, 1996. 
1 Public Enemy, Louder Than a Bomb, on IT TAKES A NATION OF 
MILLIONS TO HOLD US BACK (DefJam Recordings 1988). 
2 David Cole, National Security State, THE NATION, Dec. 17, 2001, at 4 
(“It is already a cliche that the attacks of September 11 ‘changed 
everything.’”). 
3 Report: Gen X Irony, Cynicism May be Permanently Obsolete, THE 
ONION, Sept. 26, 2001, at 2. 
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Reference to September 11 by government officials became proof 
enough that the relationship between people and government must 
change, the only question remaining being, by how much? 
Questioning the prudence or necessity of policies proposing to 
radically alter the powers of government was dismissed as 
unpatriotic or helpful to terrorists. People’s fears were 
commodified and manipulated. Against this backdrop, the rules 
governing police investigations of political activists in New York 
City came under attack. 
The consent decree in Handschu v. Special Services Division, 
which included what is referred to as the Handschu Settlement 
and which was agreed to in 1985 by New York City residents 
and the New York City Police Department (NYPD), governs 
police investigations of groups or individuals that engage in 
various forms of political activity.4 In September 2002, the 
NYPD and the City of New York—defendants in the Handschu 
case—sought and obtained modification of the consent decree.5 
This note focuses on the mechanics of the Handschu 
Settlement and the arguments for and against modification. Part I 
summarizes the law regarding modification of consent decrees. 
Part II reviews the consent decree entered into in Handschu,6 the 
                                                          
4 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), 
aff’d, 787 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1986). See Tom Perrotta, Police Ask Court to 
View Secret Papers, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 2002, at 1 (reporting that “Handschu” 
is Barbara Handschu, an attorney from Buffalo, N.Y., the first named plaintiff 
in this class action). 
5 Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Modify the Consent Decree 
Presently In Effect in this Action [hereinafter Defs.’ Mem. of Law], Handschu 
v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Kevin Flynn & 
Jacob H. Fries, Police Ask to Change the Rules and Ease Restrictions on 
Political Investigations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2002, at A18. 
6 Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1384. See Paul Chevigny, Politics and Law in 
the Control of Local Surveillance, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 735 (1984) 
(discussing the settlement agreement, which at that time still was not finalized 
or entered as an order in the court). Professor Chevigny was lead counsel for 
the plaintiffs in the Handschu case, and his discussion reviewed public and 
judicial reactions to local police surveillance in cities and states around the 
country. Id. at 738-39. See also Eric Lardiere, Comment, The Justiciability 
and Constitutionality of Political Intelligence Gathering, 30 U.C.L.A. L. 
STEIGMANMACRO.DOC 6/25/03 5:06 PM 
 HANDSCHU POST-SEPTEMBER 11 747 
background of the decree, relevant terms of the decree and 
subsequent litigation. Part II also describes the modifications 
sought by the defendants as well as the court’s decision to modify 
the decree.7 Part III analyzes the defendants’ motion and the 
district court decision, illustrating possible results of modification 
by considering the outcome of a similar case.8 Part III discusses 
whether the defendants’ assertion that the threat of terrorism 
required modification of the decree is supportable. The note 
concludes by arguing that contrary to the assessment that 
terrorism required modification, circumstances have not changed 
with respect to the facts or the law in a way that warrants 
modification.9 The city we currently live in might be different 
than before September 11 because of the supposed newly 
discovered realization that the city is vulnerable to attack.10 The 
NYPD legitimately wants to prevent possible future terrorist 
attacks. But one thing is certain: before the Handschu plaintiffs 
obtained the consent decree with the NYPD, the NYPD abused 
constitutional rights when it conducted investigations based on 
individuals’ protected speech and political affiliations. The police 
targeted critics of the government and social justice activists 
because of what they thought. The decree helped to curb that 
abuse, at least creating a deterrent to abuse and a mechanism for 
people to learn of and put a halt to unfair and unfounded 
                                                          
REV. 976 (1983) (exploring government surveillance of political activity and 
considering the manner in which citizens can sue to enjoin the government 
from conducting these activities). 
7 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2134 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003). 
8 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 799 (7th Cir. 
2001) (modifying a similar consent decree for reasons that are posited by the 
NYC defendants in Handschu). See infra Part III.C. 
9 See infra Part III (arguing that modification is not warranted because the 
NYPD gives no persuasive argument for reinstating unchecked monitoring of 
political actors). 
10 The words “vulnerable to attack” are used with caution. For an 
explication of recent trends in speech about war, citizenship and enemies, see 
Leti Volpp, Critical Race Studies: The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 U.C.L.A. 
L. REV. 1575, 1586-90 (2002) (commenting that recent political developments 
have tended to return racist and marginalizing thinking to common usage). 
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investigations. Nothing about terrorism or September 11 changed 
the necessity for oversight of police action in this regard. It is 
certainly a stressful time in our history. New York City residents 
should be skeptical of government enthusiasm for eliminating 
oversight in these stressful times. Indeed, the current state of 
affairs may actually increase the need for oversight. Without the 
decree in place, a known risk is created—the risk that police 
abuses will occur and go unrelieved in the absence of oversight. 
I. CONSENT DECREES: PURPOSE, POLICY, ENFORCEMENT AND 
MODIFICATION 
Consent decrees, or consent orders, are settlement 
agreements between litigants and have the same force as court 
orders.11 When a court approves a decree, it “places its 
imprimatur upon a solemn compact between the parties,” 
committing “the full power of the judiciary to implement 
effectively the obligations undertaken in the decree.”12 
Commentators note that consent decrees are not a radical 
concept; rather, they are a creative way to use the courts to 
obtain justice not forthcoming elsewhere.13 
                                                          
11 Lloyd C. Anderson, Implementation of Consent Decrees in Structural 
Reform Litigation, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 725 (1986) (defining a consent 
decree as “an agreement of the parties in settlement of litigation . . . which the 
court approves and embodies in an order”). 
12 Id. at 726. 
13 See Theodore Eisenberg & Stephen C. Yeazall, The Ordinary and the 
Extraordinary in Institutional Litigation, 93 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1980) 
(arguing that institutional reform litigation is not as radical a concept as other 
critics have noted and that the biggest changes that such litigation brings are 
new entitlements); see also Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational 
Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265 
(1983) (pointing out that federal judges are in a very difficult position when 
presiding over decrees, given their lack of expertise and inability to be 
effective managers, but not concluding that structural injunctions should not be 
pursued); Margo Schlanger, The Courts: Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional 
Reform Litigation as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994 (1999) (arguing that 
concentration on the federal judge when considering institutional reform 
litigation impoverishes the debate on reform, as many other factors put 
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A. Reform Litigation and Consent Decrees 
The earliest cases that created the foundation for reform 
litigation were school desegregation cases,14 but later cases have 
included a wide range of public entities.15 Parties have used 
consent decrees to enforce the constitutional and statutory rights 
and freedoms of citizens facing all types of government actions 
and intrusions.16 Consent decrees are most controversial when the 
                                                          
pressure on any area of social movement). 
14 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (establishing that 
courts, in order to facilitate the desegregation process, demand in their orders 
more stringent requirements than might have been available had the case been 
fully litigated and not ended in a settlement); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (requiring a unitary school system under a 
district court-approved desegregation plan and reiterating approval of broad 
federal equitable power where local authority defaults on its obligations). 
15 See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (1990) (discussing 
aspects of contempt actions brought to enforce consent order in Yonkers, a 
community particularly reluctant to obey the strictures of the twenty-year-old 
agreement between citizens and the local government that required an end to 
discriminatory public housing administration); United States v. Paradise, 480 
U.S. 149 (1987) (ordering one-for-one black state trooper hiring regime on 
Alabama Department of Public Safety due to its years of recalcitrance in the 
hiring or promotion of blacks); United States v. City of Los Angeles, 288 
F.3d 391 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding agreement between the federal 
government and Los Angeles to discontinue practice of depriving individuals 
of constitutional rights “through the use of excessive force, false arrests and 
improper searches and seizures”); Labor/Community Strategy Center v. L.A. 
County Metro. Transp. Auth., 263 F.3d 1041 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding an 
agreement between bus riders and city authority to end discriminatory practice 
in providing bus services); Glover v. Johnson, 138 F.3d 229 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(issuing an order to establish satisfactory educational programs and allow 
inmates access to courts); Juan F. v. Weicker, 37 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1994) 
(upholding an agreement between neglected or abandoned children and the 
State of Connecticut to fix the constitutionally-violative administration of child 
welfare); French v. Owens, 777 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1985) (upholding an 
injunction against intolerable prison conditions in Indiana facilities); United 
States v. Frazer, 317 F. Supp. 1079 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (same). 
16 See, e.g., Holland v. N.J. Dep’t of Corr., 246 F.3d 267 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(prohibiting by consent decree race and gender discrimination and harassment 
of employees of New Jersey Department of Corrections); Watson v. Ray, 192 
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plaintiffs are citizens (or the federal government) and the 
defendant a state or municipal agency.17 Such decrees raise issues 
of appropriate remedies18 and how those remedies should be 
                                                          
F.3d 1153 (8th Cir. 1999) (requiring by consent decree between Iowa State 
Penitentiary inmates and state officials, certain minimum prison conditions); 
Alexander v. Britt, 89 F.3d 194 (4th Cir. 1996) (requiring by consent decree 
between North Carolina citizen program applicants and the state’s 
administrators of welfare and Medicaid programs, that the administrators 
process claims with certain timeliness); Berger v. Heckler, 771 F.2d 1556 (2d 
Cir. 1985) (establishing ability of parties to enforce consent decrees through 
contempt actions and requiring the U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services to provide certain benefits to aliens); Chairs v. Burgess, 25 F. 
Supp.2d 1333 (N.D. Ala. 1998) (establishing a consent decree between 
Alabama jail inmates and corrections officials prohibiting overcrowding in 
jails and requiring timely transfers of inmates to prisons); United States v. 
City of Philadelphia, 499 F. Supp. 1196 (E.D. Pa. 1980) (restraining by 
consent decree gender discrimination in Philadelphia Police Department); Doe 
v. Dinkins, 192 A.D.2d 270 (1st Dep’t 1993) (establishing the so-called 
“Callahan consent decree” requiring New York City to provide shelter for any 
qualified homeless man). 
17 Robert F. Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal 
Equitable Remedies, 30 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1978) (concluding that the 
separation of powers doctrine ought to inform a court’s exercise of equitable 
powers in institutional reform litigation). Professor Nagel recognized, on the 
other hand, that the Supreme Court stated the opposite in Elrod v. Burns, 427 
U.S. 347 (1976), and the “extreme pressures that can exist for using the 
federal courts as substitutes [for legislative and executive action].” Id. at 664. 
He was concerned that fundamental democratic values were going to be 
sacrificed “in order to vindicate particular constitutional rights,” id. at 664, 
and thus courts ought to defer to judgments of state executive and legislative 
actors. Id. at 719. See also Alan Effron, Note, Federalism and Federal 
Consent Decrees Against State Governmental Entities, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 
1796 (1988) (arguing that the federal courts’ powers over state administrative 
agencies raise significant federalism concerns); Tamia Perry, Note, In the 
Interest of Justice: The Impact of Court-Ordered Reform on the City of New 
York, 42 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1239 (1991) (considering the impact on the 
autonomy of New York City government actors from the imposition of federal 
orders). 
18 See Colin S. Diver, Special Project-The Remedial Process in 
Institutional Reform Litigation, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 784 (1978) (detailing the 
problems facing the creation of remedies and discussing how to represent the 
interests of the parties). 
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constructed and applied when the plaintiffs represent a class.19 
Consent decrees are entered into in the pursuit of institutional 
reform.20 They are sometimes necessary to force government 
agencies to achieve their mandates within constitutional bounds.21 
Plaintiffs generally seek declaratory relief that a particular 
practice violates their rights in some way. They also seek 
injunctive relief, which, if obtained, serves to order the agency to 
do or stop doing something.22 Consent decrees are attractive to 
defendants because defendants can contribute to the expedited 
outcome of the case.23 Consent decrees are attractive to plaintiffs 
because rights are vindicated and the federal courts oversee 
implementation in the event that agencies refuse to abide by the 
law.24 Consent decrees are also attractive to plaintiffs because 
they provide relief that may not be available through litigation. 
Of course, consent decrees are not a panacea. Parties are 
sometimes reluctant to abide by the terms of a decree.25 
Moreover, as judicial instruments, the decrees are susceptible to 
                                                          
19 See Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law by Private Bargain: Title VII 
Consent Decrees and the Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 198 
DUKE L.J. 887 (1984) (questioning how the agreements reached in Title VII 
consent decrees can be fair to all people involved when such cases include 
people who are not parties). 
20 See, e.g., Diver, supra note 18, at 809-12 (discussing the remedial 
process when the settlements have been negotiated as in most consent orders). 
21 Horowitz, supra note 13, at 1266-67 (recognizing courts as actors in 
reform). 
22 See generally Anderson, supra note 11 (discussing in detail all elements 
that should be present in a workable consent decree and reviewing case studies 
of three consent decrees); Horowitz, supra note 13, at 1266-67 (discussing the 
structural injunctions imposed on the courts through reform litigation. 
23 Anderson, supra note 11, at 726. 
24 Id. 
25 See, e.g., Karla Grossenbacher, Note, Implementing Structural 
Injunctions: Getting a Remedy When Local Officials Resist, 80 GEO. L.J. 2227 
(1992) (discussing Spallone v. United States and arguing that given the ability 
to pursue options to enforce the decrees, federal judges ought to act forcibly to 
ensure that the relief is actually forthcoming); Eric A. Rosand, Note, Consent 
Decrees in Welfare Litigation: The Obstacles to Compliance, 28 COLUM. J.L. 
& SOC. PROBS. 83 (1994) (discussing the necessity of parties to continuously 
sue to enforce the consent decrees they have obtained). 
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manipulation.26 The fact that a settlement has not been litigated 
extensively is not necessarily evidence that the settlement 
performed its task.27 Lack of litigation could also be due to 
factors impeding the capacity of either party to get to court,28 or 
it could mean that the parties addressed all the subsequent issues 
of implementation outside the courtroom.29 
B. Judicial Intervention and Modification of Consent Decrees 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize courts to 
modify consent decrees.30 Specifically, Rule 60(b)(5) provides 
that on motion the court can relieve a party from a final judgment 
or order if “it is no longer equitable that the judgment should 
have prospective application.”31 Courts can also provide relief for 
“any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment.”32 Historically, the Supreme Court recognized that 
                                                          
26 See, e.g., Julie K. Rademaker, Note, Alliance to End Repression v. 
City of Chicago: Judicial Abandonment of Consent Decree Principles, 80 NW. 
U.L. REV. 1675 (1986) (arguing that the interpretation of the consent order in 
that case ignored fundamental aspects of the original agreement). 
27 See Anderson, supra note 11, at 727 (noting that lack of litigation could 
result from the court prodding the parties along without resort to formal 
judicial measures). 
28 Id. at 728 (noting alternatively that the absence of written opinions 
might be the consequence of a defendant evading enforcement or the plaintiffs 
losing interest). 
29 Id. (recognizing that “[e]ach decree involves its own unique 
circumstances and a reader should not judge the success of a decree merely by 
whether it generates court opinions”); see also Horowitz, supra note 13, at 
1302 (noting that courts prefer that parties handle subsequent issues without 
judicial oversight). 
30 See FED. R. CIV. P. 60 (allowing for modification of court orders by 
motion for relief from a judgment or order pursuant to the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure). 
31 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5). See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 
237-39 (1997) (allowing relief from judgment under rule 60(b)(5) where the 
Supreme Court found establishment clause law had significantly changed). 
32 FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6). See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. 
Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863, 863 n.11 (1988) (recognizing federal 
court authority to relieve a party from judgment in the extraordinary 
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even where the order is by consent, a “court does not abdicate its 
power to revoke or modify its mandate, if satisfied that what it 
has been doing has been turned into, through changing 
circumstances, an instrument of wrong.”33 The Court also 
cautioned that “[n]othing less than a clear showing of grievous 
wrong evoked by new and unforeseen conditions should lead” a 
court to modify the agreement.34 According to the Court, a new 
statute altering the rights of the parties is one circumstance that 
can require the modification of a consent decree.35 At least one 
lower court noted that Rule 60(b) assumes the propriety of the 
order and refers instead to “some change in conditions that 
makes continued enforcement inequitable.”36 
The leading case governing modification of consent decrees 
in institutional reform litigation is Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk 
County Jail.37 In Rufo, the Supreme Court ruled that courts 
                                                          
circumstance where the district judge presiding over a dispute had a fiduciary 
interest in an interested party). 
33 United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114-15 (1932) (holding 
that a prospective decree is always subject to adaptation as necessary). In 
Swift, modification was not allowed because the evidence showed that the 
defendant corporation would return to its abuse of power as a meat packing 
monopoly. Id. at 117. Meat packing corporations sought to modify the consent 
decree to allow them to sell groceries as well as meat, but cited no changes 
that warranted modification. Id. at 116. 
34 Id. at 119. 
35 Sys. Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Employees’ Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 
U.S. 642, 651-652 (1961) (citing Swift for the proposition that courts have the 
power to modify consent decrees). Employees and corporation had agreed on a 
specific price to not establish a union shop. Id. at 644. The statute governing 
employment of railroad workers was amended, allowing for unions. Id. The 
petitioners moved for modification of the consent decree but the district court 
denied the motion and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Id. at 646. The Supreme 
Court reversed, recognizing that the parties could not require enforcement of 
rights that the statute no longer offered. Id. at 652. 
36 Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529, 530 (2d Cir. 1964) (holding that 
plaintiff tax objector was entitled to maintenance of order as issued where 
facts had not changed). The court in Schildhaus observed that Rule 60(b) was 
not intended to be a substitute for an appeal from an erroneous judgment. Id. 
at 531. 
37 502 U.S. 367 (1992) (establishing the test for modification of consent 
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should no longer hold the proponent of modification to the 
stringent grievous wrong standard when determining whether 
modification is warranted.38 The consent decree in Rufo arose out 
of a complaint by inmates in the Suffolk County Jail in Boston, 
Massachusetts.39 The plaintiffs alleged, and the district court 
found, unconstitutional conditions in the jail.40 
Seventeen years after the original decree, the defendants 
sought modification.41 The request was denied by the district 
court,42 and the First Circuit upheld the denial.43 The Supreme 
Court then reversed the decision and lowered the modification 
threshold, holding that the “party seeking modification of a 
consent decree must establish that a significant change in the facts 
or law warrants revision of the decree and that the proposed 
modification is suitably tailored to the changed circumstance.”44 
                                                          
decrees in institutional reform litigation). The consent decree between the 
inmates and the Suffolk County sheriff “permanently enjoined the 
government” from double-celling inmates. Rufo, 502 U.S. at 373. See also 
Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 161-62 (2d Cir. 1999) (en banc) (noting 
that the proposition laid out in Swift and System Federation No. 91 is well 
established, and that modification authority still extends to consent decrees); 
David I. Levine, The Modification of Equitable Decrees in Institutional 
Reform Litigation: A Commentary on the Supreme Court’s Adoption of the 
Second Circuit’s Flexible Test, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 1239, 1275-76 (1993) 
(recognizing that the Court changed the Swift test and that the Rufo standard 
for modification rests on the fact that institutional reform cases are fact 
specific, and therefore flexibility in modification is warranted when facts have 
changed). 
38 See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 393. 
39 See Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Eisenstadt, 360 F. Supp. 676 (D. 
Mass. 1973), aff’d, 494 F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974). 
40 Id. at 686 (holding that the pretrial detainment facility at issue 
“unnecessarily and unreasonably infringes upon [the inmates’] most basic 
liberties, among them the rights to reasonable freedom of motion, personal 
cleanliness, and personal privacy”). 
41 See Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 734 F. Supp. 561 (D. 
Mass. 1990). 
42 Id. at 566. 
43 See Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Kearney, 915 F.2d 1557 (1st Cir. 
1990). 
44 Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 393 (1992). 
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Further, the modification must neither create nor perpetuate a 
constitutional violation45 and should not seek the constitutional 
floor.46 The Rufo Court prescribed consideration of whether the 
primary purpose of the consent decree had been achieved.47 The 
Court did not, however, hold that satisfaction of the primary 
purpose is a necessary precursor to modification.48 
The flexible test outlined in Rufo did not shift the burden; 
defendants still must prove that facts and law have changed to 
warrant modification.49 Plaintiffs do not, after Rufo, have the 
burden of showing that those circumstances have not changed.50 
The Court noted that a change in the law as a result of decisions 
clarifying the law can only constitute “a change in the 
circumstances that would support modification if the parties had 
based their agreement on a misunderstanding of the governing 
law.”51 Lamentably, the Court’s opinion provides very little 
guidance to determine whether and how the law has changed.52 
                                                          
45 Id. at 391 (noting that petitioners, to prevail on this prong, would have 
to show that double-celling of pretrial detainees at the Suffolk County Jail was 
constitutional). 
46 Id. The Court noted that because the district court had determined that 
conditions at the jail were unconstitutional, and that because the parties had 
settled on particular relief, a modification that removed all the protections 
above what had been determined as constitutional was prohibited. Id. 
47 Id. at 382. But see Levine, supra note 37, at 1268-69 (arguing that the 
determination of the primary purpose, unless such a primary purpose is 
explicitly laid out by the parties, is very difficult and leaves the door open for 
appellate review). 
48 Rufo, 502 U.S. at 382. 
49 Levine, supra note 37, at 1269-70. 
50 Id. Had that occurred, only defendants would have the benefit of the 
flexible test. Id. 
51 Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 390 (1992) 
(recognizing that the sheriff would have to establish that the parties mistakenly 
believed that single-celling of pretrial detainees was mandated by the 
Constitution to warrant modification). 
52 Levine, supra note 37, at 1273-75 (noting that a determination of 
whether the law has changed for purposes of modification could depend on 
whether the defendants had committed to abiding by their constitutional 
obligations or committed to abiding by an injunction not required by the 
Constitution). 
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II. THE HANDSCHU SETTLEMENT 
The events leading up to the Handschu Settlement consisted 
of abusive police practices sufficiently shocking to compel 
plaintiffs to sue.53 The plaintiffs extracted some major 
concessions from the NYPD in the shape of promises by the 
police to conduct their activities within certain parameters and 
created a mechanism for individuals to determine whether their 
rights had been violated.54 The limited subsequent litigation of the 
settlement suggests its effectiveness at establishing oversight and 
promoting deterrence.55 Defendants moved to modify the 
settlement in September 2002 to remove its principal protections, 
and the district court granted the modification request.56 
A. Arriving at Handschu 
In the 1960s the NYPD stepped up surveillance and other 
investigatory efforts to include “more undercover and other 
surveillance of ‘groups that because of their conduct or rhetoric 
may pose a threat to life, property, or governmental 
administration’; of ‘malcontents’; and ‘of groups or individuals 
whose purpose is the disruption of governmental activities for the 
peace and harmony of the community.’”57 Police officials 
                                                          
53 See infra Part II.A (discussing background of the decree). 
54 See infra Part II.A (describing terms of the settlement). 
55 See infra Part II.B (discussing subsequent litigation). That is, when 
police acted outside the settlement, the plaintiffs went to court and obtained 
judgments that their rights had been violated, even though they could not get 
the court to hold the defendants in contempt. 
56 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 3643, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2003) (accepting the NYPD’s 
additions to the patrol guide). See also Tom Perrotta, Police Win Battle to 
Remove Restrictions on Surveillance, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 13, 2003, at 2 (reporting 
that the district court had agreed to the modifications sought by the 
defendants); infra Part II.B (listing defendants’ arguments and discussing the 
district court’s decision). 
57 Aff. of New York City Police Commissioner Patrick V. Murphy 
[hereinafter Murphy Aff.], quoted in Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. 
Supp. 1384, 1396 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). See also Chevigny, supra note 6, at 735-
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conceded that their activities included intelligence gathering “not 
limited to investigations of crime, but related to any activity 
likely to result in ‘a serious police problem.’”58 For example, a 
two-year investigation of one citizen, which yielded a single, 
unregistered and subsequently suppressed handgun, comprised, 
according to the court, countless unconscionable violations of the 
individual’s rights and a terrific waste of city resources.59 
A class of plaintiffs composed of various political groups 
                                                          
36 (noting that political surveillance, which had existed as early as 1904 with 
the NYPD’s “Italian Squad,” became more active in the 1960s). One reason 
for the increased activity was that the police had more work to deal with an 
increase in “demands for reform and radical change.” Id. at 736. Another was 
public interest in knowing who and what were causing social upheaval of the 
times. Id. Federal funding was made available to local law enforcement to 
assist in surveillance efforts. Id. 
58 Murphy Aff., supra note 57, quoted in Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 
1396 (acknowledging police investigations of radicals and protesters included 
use of “infiltration and informers, and telephone wiretapping, electronic 
eavesdropping, surreptitious recording of conversations, covert photography 
of individuals attending demonstrations, and recording speeches at 
demonstrations”). The police also would issue false press credentials to its 
officers and would “routinely furnish information about individuals signing 
petitions or attending meetings” to the state bar. Id. The case does not define a 
“serious police problem.” Id. A reasonable place to look for a definition might 
be where the police focused their resources. See, e.g., People v. Collier, 376 
N.Y.S.2d. 954, 955 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (discussing investigation of a Lower East 
Side community activist). Vietnam War protesters were targets, Murphy Aff., 
supra note 57, quoted in Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1396, as were Black 
Panthers, Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1397. 
59 See People v. Collier, 376 N.Y.S.2d. at 958-59 (detailing the 
circumstances of a particular wide-ranging investigation, while laying out the 
activities of an undercover New York City Police detective over two years). 
The court described how the detective was assigned to spy on the defendant 
and followed this model citizen to a steady procession of school board 
meetings, local hospital meetings, anti-drug campaign work and other general 
community activism. Id. at 961-63. Part of the detective’s disguise included 
holding himself out to be unemployed; the defendant actually tried to get the 
detective work at various times, including letting him babysit for spending 
cash. Id. at 967. The detective produced hundreds of memos on the defendant 
and submitted them to his superiors in the Bureau of Special Services. Id. at 
959. The trial court condemned this outrageous investigation at great length. 
Id. at 979-88. 
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filed a lawsuit in the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York against the mayor and police commissioner of the City 
of New York and other police officials.60 The complaint charged 
that the infiltration and maintenance of information about the 
plaintiff class violated plaintiffs’ First Amendment and other 
constitutional rights.61 Plaintiffs further alleged that the 
Intelligence Division of the NYPD engaged in summary 
punishment to deter plaintiffs from lawful association and 
political activity62 and that the activities of the NYPD had a 
chilling effect on the exercise of the plaintiffs’ constitutional 
rights of speech, assembly and association.63 
The plaintiff class and the NYPD agreed to a settlement, 
which resulted in a consent decree, whereby the police would 
conduct investigations of political actors only within certain 
                                                          
60 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 349 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) 
(establishing plaintiff class of various political groups on behalf of themselves 
and all residents of New York City that were or may in the future may become 
targets of political surveillance by the NYPD). 
61 See Handschu, 349 F. Supp. at 768 (denying defendants’ motion to 
dismiss). This action was brought by Professor Chevigny and others. Id. at 
766. Plaintiffs alleged that seven specific categories of practices and conduct 
of the Security and Investigation Section were unconstitutional. Id. The 
categories were: use of informers, infiltration, interrogation, overt 
surveillance, summary punishment, intelligence gathering and electronic 
surveillance. Id. at 768. The plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief. 
Id. at 767. One of the original plaintiffs was Shaba Om, a member of the 
“Panther 21.” Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1384. The police had infiltrated the 
Black Panthers and charged them with a plot to blow up department stores and 
police stations, but the jury acquitted the Black Panthers on all counts after 
determining police agents had “manipulated the defendants with ideas and 
encouragement and then greatly exaggerated their misdeeds to police 
superiors.” See Chisun Lee, The NYPD Wants to Watch You: Nation’s Largest 
Law Enforcement Agency Vies for Total Spying Power, VILLAGE VOICE, Dec. 
18-24, 2002, at 33 (discussing the background of Handschu). 
62 Handschu, 349 F. Supp. at 768. 
63 Id. Police agents at public gatherings, for example, could create an 
“atmosphere of fear and intimidation.” Chevigny, supra note 6, at 737. This 
fear and intimidation would be compounded by the knowledge that the police 
were collecting names and building dossiers. Id. 
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limits.64 The settlement established an ‘Authority’ (the Authority) 
to oversee the activities of the Public Security Section (PSS) of 
the Intelligence Division.65 The majority decisions of the 
Authority were binding on the PSS.66 The NYPD could not 
engage in any investigation of political activity, which the 
settlement defined as “the exercise of a right of expression or 
association for the purpose of maintaining or changing 
governmental policies or social conditions.”67 The settlement 
authorized the PSS to commence an investigation only after the 
NYPD established “specific information”68 that “a person or 
group engaged in political activity is engaged in, about to engage 
in, or threatened to engage in conduct which constitutes a 
                                                          
64 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), 
aff’d, 787 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1986). 
65 Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1417-24 (“Handschu Settlement”), § III. 
Further references to the settlement will be to section number in annexed 
pages 1417-24 to the district court opinion. The three members of the 
Authority were the First Deputy Commissioner of the Police Department, the 
Deputy Commissioner for Legal Affairs, and a civilian member appointed by 
the mayor for a term revocable at will. Id. § III. The Public Security Section 
(PSS) was the then current incarnation of the Special Services Division, named 
in the original complaint. Handschu, 349 F. Supp. at 767. These names, 
‘PSS,’ ‘Intelligence Division,’ and ‘NYPD,’ as well as ‘police,’ are used 
interchangeably. 
66  Handschu, 349 F. Supp. at 767. The membership of the Authority has 
been criticized because the input of the civilian member can be nullified, as 
majority decisions are binding. Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1410 (agreeing that 
the civilian member cannot be automatically assumed to be a “booby”). See 
also David Berry, Note, The First Amendment and Law Enforcement 
Infiltration of Political Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 207, 232 (1982) (arguing, 
inter alia, that settlements, including the Handschu Settlement, are inadequate 
to protect constitutional rights and citing the lack of independent oversight as 
one factor exemplary of the inadequacy). But see Chevigny, supra note 6, at 
765-66 (maintaining that the civilian member is a good and necessary part of 
the Authority, defending the composition of the Authority with the observation 
that settlements are the products of negotiations, and conceding that it would 
be best, obviously, to have an independent review board with the ability to 
conduct inquiries). 
67 Handschu Settlement, supra note 65, § II.A. 
68 Id. § IV.C. 
STEIGMANMACRO.DOC 6/25/03 5:06 PM 
760 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
crime.”69 Prior to any criminal investigative efforts, the PSS had 
to submit to the Authority an “Investigation Statement” 
specifying the factual predicate.70 Approved investigations could 
be conducted for thirty days, with possible extensions.71 If the 
commanding officer of the Intelligence Division desired to use 
undercover personnel in an investigation, the officer had to first 
apply for approval showing good cause for the investigation and 
that the use of undercover personnel was essential.72 
Information obtained during investigations of individuals, 
groups or organizations could be collected or maintained only in 
conformity with the settlement.73 Information “from publicly 
available sources” could not be maintained with the PSS.74 
Officers were only allowed to collect certain, general information 
about a planned non-criminal event “in order to preserve the 
peace, deploy manpower for control of crowds and protect the 
right[s] of individuals to freedom of speech and assembly.”75 
Specifically, the PSS could not retain information that an 
individual had signed a particular petition, that an individual’s 
name appeared on a particular mailing list, that an individual 
financially supported a particular political group or the group’s 
aims, or that an individual had published anything that could be 
said to expound a particular political view.76 Information 
collected pursuant to the settlement guidelines “[could] be 
distributed only to law enforcement agencies or government 
                                                          
69 Id. § IV.C. 
70 Id. § IV.C(1). If the PSS showed good cause, it could initiate the 
investigation and apply for approval within forty-eight hours. Id. The factual 
predicate is the specific information of criminal activity or threatened criminal 
activity. Id. 
71 Id. § IV.C(6)(b). 
72 Id. § IV.C(6). 
73 Handschu Settlement, supra note 65, § VI.A. To be in conformity with 
the settlement, the approvals must have been sought and obtained. Id. 
74 Id. The settlement does not define publicly available sources. Id. 
75 Id. § IV.B The information allowed to be collected in such an ‘Event 
Planning Inquiry’ pertains to general information about the event. Id. 
76 Id. § VI.B(1)-(4). 
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agencies conducting security clearance procedures”77 and could 
not be disseminated “unless the requesting agency agree[d] in 
writing to conform strictly with the provisions” of the 
settlement.78 The settlement prohibited developing a file on an 
individual or group based solely on that individual’s or group’s 
“political, religious, sexual or economic preference.”79 
Additionally, the settlement created a mechanism for citizens 
who believed they were the subjects of surveillance to obtain 
confirmation of the surveillance from the Authority via an 
inquiry.80 If the target of an investigation confirmed that 
surveillance was conducted, the target could request that the 
Authority inquire of the PSS to determine whether the 
investigation was conducted in accordance with the settlement.81 
If the Authority determined that the investigation violated the 
settlement, the Authority would then determine the disposition of 
the gathered material and submit a report to the police 
commissioner, who was required to initiate appropriate 
disciplinary measures.82 The activities of the PSS were reviewed 
annually by the commanding officer of the Intelligence Division 
and submitted to the Authority.83 The report included an 
accounting of the past year’s investigations, which had to be 
turned over to the police commissioner and submitted to the 
mayor.84 
The Second Circuit upheld the settlement in the face of strong 
                                                          
77 Id. § VII.A. 
78 Id. § VII.D. 
79 Handschu Settlement, supra note 65, § VI.C. 
80 Id. § V.A. There is no indication in the settlement how the Authority 
conducts its inquiry. Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. § V.B. See also Berry, supra note 66, at 232 (critiquing the 
Handschu Settlement and noting that disciplinary measures are no substitute 
for real punishment of violations). 
83  Handschu Settlement, supra note 65, § VIII. 
84 Id. §§ IX.A-B. There is no indication in the settlement what the mayor 
is to do with the report. Id. There is also no mention of any public reporting 
requirement. Id. 
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objections.85 Those who objected were concerned that settling 
would inhibit public awareness of police abuse and that the 
NYPD would not be held accountable for past wrongs visited 
upon New York City residents.86 That is, past illegal activities of 
the NYPD would not be adjudicated, and the settlement 
incorporated no admissions of wrongdoing by the NYPD.87 
Objectors also feared that the settlement would prevent New 
Yorkers from benefiting from constitutional principles that might 
arise after the settlement had been approved.88 The objectors 
were concerned that if the law changed in the future to 
incorporate, for example, stronger First Amendment protections, 
the settlement would stifle the change’s application to the plaintiff 
class of New York residents.89 
The district court noted that the desire to have the defendants 
admit their wrongs was understandable but was inconsistent with 
the nature of settlements.90 To allay the objectors’ fears, the court 
acknowledged the settlement’s flexibility, writing that “if future 
cases declare constitutionally guaranteed rights and privileges 
which do not presently exist, the Guidelines are automatically 
amended pro tanto.”91 Discussing the wording of the Handschu 
                                                          
85 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 787 F.2d 828, 831 (2d Cir. 1986). 
The objectors complained that they did not have notice of the settlement, but 
the court considered the uproar among the groups as evidence that the due 
process requirements of notice were met. Handschu, 787 F.2d at 832-33. The 
objectors also did not consider the settlement agreement fair and reasonable, 
but the court thought otherwise, concluding that the plaintiffs had obtained 
“very respectable” concessions from the NYPD. Id. at 834; see also 
Handschu, 605 F. Supp. 1397-99. 
86 Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1398 (noting objectors’ concerns); 
Chevigny, supra note 6, at 761-65 (addressing objectors concerns). 
87 Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1399. 
88 Id. at 1405. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. The court recognized the objectors’ “passionate desire . . . that 
whatever illegalities the NYPD perpetrated in earlier years be exposed to the 
light of day by a full plenary record. It is easy enough to understand that 
desire in human terms. But it is absolutely inconsistent with the salutary 
purpose of class action settlements.” Id. 
91 Id. at 1406 (internal citations removed). “Pro tanto” means that the 
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Settlement, Judge Haight remarked: 
If, as defendants’ counsel profess, the NYPD has 
abandoned any prior abuses and now views constitutional 
principles with pure and undistilled enthusiasm, no words 
of restraint are necessary; the millenium [sic] is at hand. 
If, as objectors apparently believe, the NYPD is 
mendacious, untrustworthy, and unalterably committed to 
continuing constitutional violations, no words are 
sufficient to avoid future controversy. I think it likely the 
real world lies somewhere between these two poles.92 
B. Litigation of the Settlement 
Subsequent litigation of the Handschu Settlement revealed 
that the real world did indeed lie somewhere between the poles. 
From 1989 to 1990, the plaintiffs litigated the settlement three 
times, using the mechanisms of the settlement to invoke their 
rights.93 Defendants sought to modify the settlement in September 
2002 and render the mechanisms much less useful.94 Modification 
was granted, and plaintiffs apparently are not planning an 
appeal.95 
                                                          
settlement would have incorporated whatever constitutional protections might 
have arisen. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1222 (6th ed. 1990). 
92 Handschu, 605 F. Supp. at 1409-10. The court was discussing the 
wording of the settlement with respect to how much of a showing the police 
would need to make in order to get approval to use informers on an 
investigation. Id. 
93 See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 131 F.R.D. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); 
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 838 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); 
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 737 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
94 Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 5. 
95 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003). See New Police Guidelines Go into Effect, 
N.Y.L.J., Mar. 26, 2003, at 1 (noting that civil liberties lawyers recently said 
they would not oppose the ruling). 
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1. Invoking Handschu 
In 1989 the plaintiffs made two separate motions to hold the 
defendants in contempt; the court refused both.96 In the first, 
plaintiffs alleged that police surveillance of black activists and a 
radio station violated the settlement.97 The court found that 
monitoring the station violated the settlement but did not hold 
defendants in contempt, noting that some ambiguities were 
inevitable when guidelines such as those in Handschu are put in 
place.98 In the second, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants 
had purposefully destroyed records plaintiffs wished to 
discover.99 The court did not consider the destruction of records 
“deliberate sabotage” and appointed a document retrieval 
expert.100 The expert’s job was to facilitate retrieval of the 
documents that the defendants claimed were not produced due to 
administrative difficulties.101 
The Handschu Settlement was also litigated in 1990,102 when 
plaintiffs sought to access notes created by an investigation 
conducted by undercover police agents.103 The agents had 
attended meetings of the New York City Civil Rights Coalition 
(the Coalition), a citizen group “formed . . . to explore the 
problem of racial bigotry in New York City.”104 The Authority 
                                                          
96 Handschu, 737 F. Supp. at 1308-09; Handschu, 838 F. Supp. at 81. 
97 Handschu, 737 F. Supp. at 1291. The activists were the “New York 8” 
who were charged but acquitted of conspiracy to free two prisoners. Id. at 
1304. The police were listening to and taping WLIB to be alerted to 
“announcements of demonstrations and meetings of interest . . . [,] 
commentaries by community leaders relating to police activities . . . and 
comments of members of the New York 8.” Id. at 1295. 
98 Id. at 1308. 
99 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 838 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 131 F.R.D. 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) 
(granting a motion by the New York City Civil Rights Coalition to compel 
discovery on its claim that the defendants were violating the settlement by 
spying on the Coalition’s activity). 
103 Id. at 51. 
104 Id. This group was formed after the Howard Beach incident. Id.; see 
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had previously supplied the Coalition with limited information 
indicating the investigation had taken place and that some 
information was obtained in violation of the settlement.105 Judge 
Haight ordered discovery, stressing that this type of discovery 
order exemplified the type authorized by the settlement.106 
2. Unsettling Handschu 
In September 2002, the defendants requested modification of 
the decree to “eliminate the restrictions on the investigation of 
‘political activity.’”107 Defendants’ contended that the settlement 
was no longer equitable in light of changes in “factual 
circumstances.”108 They cited a string of attacks on United States 
military and civilian targets for the proposition that the NYPD 
“had no conception of the challenge it would face in protecting 
the City and its people from international terrorism” when it 
                                                          
also PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 58 (1991). 
In 1986, three black men were beaten by a group of white teenagers in the 
predominantly white community of Howard Beach in Queens. Id. One of the 
victims fled the group and, in attempting to escape across a highway, was hit 
by a car and killed. Id. What ensued in the public and press was an ugly, 
racist display founded on an implicit notion that the presence of the men in 
that neighborhood itself was threatening to the community and the beatings 
thus warranted. Id. at 58-59. For a full account of the incident and aftermath, 
see generally id. at 58-61. 
105 Handschu, 131 F.R.D. at 51. 
106 Id. at 52. 
107 Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 5. The NYPD, following its 
September 2002 modification motion, asked the district court to review sealed 
testimony of Intelligence Commissioner David Cohen. Tom Perrotta, Police 
Ask Court to View Secret Papers: City Seeks Modification of Surveillance 
Rule, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 6, 2002, at 1. This testimony was supplemental to that 
contained in the motion and apparently based upon confidential information 
the public release of which would have compromised an ongoing investigation. 
Id. The police filed additional papers that denied that the modifications sought 
constituted a post-September 11 power grab. Tom Perrotta, Police Defend Bid 
to Relax Spying Rules, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 27, 2002, at 1. The police further 
alleged that the safety of New Yorkers would be jeopardized by continued 
adherence to the settlement agreement. Id. 
108 Id. 
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agreed to the settlement in 1985.109 Defendants also stated that a 
“terrorist infiltration of America” had occurred,110 that the 
“present terrorist threat requires the concerted compilation and 
exchange of data,” and that the settlement precluded the NYPD 
from these functions.111 
                                                          
109 Id. at 12. Specifically, the defendants cited: 
The bombing of military bases in Saudi Arabia; the killing of nineteen 
U.S. airmen in the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing; the October 2000 
attack on the battleship Cole in Yemen; the assault on United States 
embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in August 
1998; the World Trade Center bombing of 1993; and the September 
11th destruction of the World Trade Center and accompanying attacks 
on the Pentagon. 
Id. 
110 Id. at 13. It should be noted here that the terms “terrorist” or 
“terrorism” ought to be cautiously invoked because they are ambiguous. See, 
e.g., United States v. Graham, 275 F.3d 490, 524-44 (6th Cir. 2001) (Cohn, 
J., dissenting) (analyzing, in detail, the legislative history of one of the federal 
definitions of terrorism and the difficulties agreeing on what constitutes 
terrorism); United States v. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182, 188 (W.D.N.Y. 
2002) (analyzing the definition of terrorism from 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2002), 18 
U.S.C. § 2339(B) (2002) and 22 U.S.C. § 2656(f) (2002)). See also 22 
U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (defining terrorism for the U.S. Department of Defense as 
“premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against 
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually 
intended to influence an audience”). The definitions are ambiguous because 
sometimes what objectively appears to be terrorism is not so designated; 
conversely, the term can be used very broadly. Compare William Blum, 
American Empire for Dummies: A Talk Given in Boulder Colorado, ZNET, at 
http://www.zmag.org/content (Oct. 21, 2002) (discussing American 
intervention in other nation’s affairs that would fit this definition, among them 
the squashing of “dissident movements” throughout Latin America in the 
1950s through the 1980s, the 1989 invasion of Panama, intervention in 
Nicaraguan elections, the bombings of Iraq and Yugoslavia, and the support 
for Cuban terrorist Orlando Bosch), with Mitchell Plitnik, Terror and History, 
ZNET, at http//:www.zmag.org/Znet.html (Nov. 6, 2002) (demonstrating the 
use of the word terror to describe the Washington D.C. sniper). An everyday 
definition is preferable; for the purposes of analysis this note defines 
“terrorism” as a violent act in support of or for the purpose of furthering 
particular political goals. 
111 Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 17. 
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According to the defendants, the settlement was too 
restrictive.112 Their motion requested a reduction in the role of 
the Authority so that its sole function would be to review records 
to determine whether constitutional violations had occurred.113 
Specifically, the defendants claimed the “criminal activity 
requirement” prohibited defendants from investigating the legal 
preparatory activities of terrorist operatives.114 Defendants argued 
that “in the case of terrorism, to wait for an indication of crime 
before investigating is to wait far too long.”115 This inability to 
investigate lawful activities restricted the “development of 
intelligence and the sharing of that intelligence.”116 
In response, plaintiffs did not deny that circumstances had 
changed in New York City.117 Instead, they posited in their brief 
and at oral argument that the settlement would not interfere with 
terrorism investigations.118 They also contended that the terrorism 
of September 11 did not involve protected political activity.119 
Judge Haight analyzed the request for modification under the 
                                                          
112 Id. at 14. 
113 Id. at 5; Defs.’ Notice of Motion, Annexed Decl. of Gail Donoghue, 
at 2, Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2134 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003). 
114 Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 5. 
115 Defs.’ Notice of Mot., Annexed Decl. of Deputy Commissioner for 
Intelligence David Cohen [hereinafter Cohen Decl.], at 15, Handschu, 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134. 
116 Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 14. 
117 Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, *28; see also Lee, supra 
note 61, at 32 (reporting that plaintiffs “acknowledge[d] that September 11 
was uniquely tragic but deny that it created a reason to grant police free access 
to lawful people’s private information”). 
118 Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, at *29-30 (quoting plaintiffs’ 
brief that “[t]he Handschu Guidelines do not restrict the investigation and 
prevention of terrorism. They have no bearing on police action except when 
an investigation focuses on a group or person engaged in political activity”). 
119 Id. at *30 (quoting plaintiffs’ brief that “[t]he Guidelines would not 
have interfered with the investigation of the September 11th hijackers because 
they were involved in no protected political activity, in New York or 
anywhere else.”). 
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test articulated by the Supreme Court in Rufo.120 He first 
considered whether defendants made a threshold showing of a 
change in facts or law requiring revision.121 He noted: 
There is no disputing Deputy Commissioner Cohen’s 
assertion that since the formulation of the Handschu 
Guidelines in 1985, ‘the world has undergone remarkable 
changes, . . . not only in terms of new threats we face but 
also in the ways we communicate and the technology we 
now use, and are used by those who seek to harm us.’122 
Judge Haight stated that “these fundamental changes in the 
threats to public security are perfectly apparent to every 
individual with any awareness of what is happening in the 
world.”123 Thus the court determined that changed circumstances 
warranted modification.124 
Judge Haight disposed of the plaintiffs’ argument by noting 
that he could not “accept its implicit assumption: that terrorists 
would never in furtherance of their unlawful purposes participate 
in ‘lawful political, religious, educational or social activities.’”125 
He supported this by pointing to the defendants’ assertion that 
one of the individuals convicted in the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing was an imam126 and concluded that “the Handschu 
Guidelines may impose restrictions upon the NYPD’s ability to 
investigate terrorism.”127 Judge Haight noted that the plaintiffs 
did not offer evidence to rebut the defendants’ contentions.128 He 
therefore found no basis to doubt the contentions that, in general, 
                                                          
120 Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, at *26. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at *27. 
123 Id. at *28. 
124 Id. at *40. 
125 Id. at *33. In other words, terrorists would never participate in 
activities that the settlement was supposed to protect. Id. 
126 Id. An imam is an Islamic religious leader. See Irshad Abdal-Haqq, 
Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origins and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC L. & 
CULTURE 27, 54 (2002). Exercise of religion is protected by the constitution. 
U.S. CONST. amend I. 
127 Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, at *35. 
128 Id. 
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the criminal activity requirement and the limits on collection and 
retention of information restricted police ability to investigate 
terrorism.129 
Judge Haight next considered whether the requested 
modification was suitably tailored to the changed 
circumstances.130 He determined that the modified Handschu 
guidelines suggested by the defendants did not create or 
perpetuate a constitutional violation because it maintained the 
police policy of conforming to “constitutionally guaranteed rights 
and privileges.”131 
Judge Haight also noted that it was within his discretion to 
determine how closely modification could approach the 
constitutional floor.132 He balanced the “cost or risk to the 
public” of not modifying the settlement “to allow the NYPD to 
combat terrorism” against the cost to the “values protected by the 
First Amendment.”133 According to Judge Haight, the 
modifications came very close to the constitutional floor but were 
“justified by the unprecedented current public dangers of 
terrorism.”134 He agreed with the defendants that maintaining the 
Authority, even with its newly limited role, kept the modification 
sufficiently above the constitutional floor to satisfy Rufo.135 The 
NYPD’s promise to incorporate the substance of the FBI 
Guidelines into the police patrol guide bolstered this 
conclusion.136 Thus, Judge Haight found that modification was 
                                                          
129 Id. at *37-38. 
130 Id. at *40. 
131 Id. at *41-42. 
132 Id. at *45. 
133 Id. at *45-47 (quoting Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago 
and the United States Department of Justice, 742 F.2d 1007, 1016 (7th Cir. 
1984) (en banc)). 
134 Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, at *47. 
135 Id. at *51. 
136 Id. at *21-23. See Att’y General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, 
Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations [hereinafter 
FBI Guidelines], at http://www.usdoj.gov:80/olp/generalcrimes2.pdf (May 
30, 2002) (amending guidelines that had been in place since the 1980s to 
include more explicit references to conducting investigations of terrorism). 
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required and suitably tailored to the change in circumstances.137 
In doing so, the court noted a third Rufo command: to “give 
significant weight to the views of the local government officials 
who must implement any modifications” because those officials 
“have primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and 
solving the problems of institutional reform.”138 Judge Haight 
assigned significant weight to the opinions of NYPD officials.139 
He then quoted Judge Posner’s invocation of the specter of 
terrorism in Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago,140 
writing: 
[M]indful of the crucial importance of preserving both 
individual freedoms and public safety, and balancing the 
legitimate demands of those two goals to the best of my 
ability, I conclude that the NYPD is entitled to a 
conditional order of the Court approving the proposed 
modifications to the consent decree and to the Handschu 
Guidelines.141 
Ultimately, he conditioned the modifications on the NYPD’s 
prompt submission to him of the text of the substance of the FBI 
Guidelines.142 
                                                          
137 Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, at *51. 
138 Id. at *60 (quoting Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 
367, 392 n.14 and 391 (1992)). 
139 Id. at *60. 
140 Id. (citing Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 237 F.3d 
799, 802 (2d Cir. 2001), which modified, due to changed circumstances, a 
consent decree arising from Chicago police investigations of political groups); 
see also infra Part III.B. 
141 Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, at *62-63. 
142 Id. at *63-64; see also FBI Guidelines, supra note 136. It should be 
noted here that an additional, perhaps more chilling, development is on the 
horizon: federal legislation rumored to be originating with the Department of 
Justice that could terminate the Handschu Settlement even if plaintiffs appeal. 
See Charles Lewis & Adam Mayle, Justice Dept. Drafts Sweeping Expansion 
of Anti-Terrorism Act, THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY, at 
http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/list.asp?L1=10&L2=0&L3=0&L4=
0&L5=0 (Feb. 7, 2003) (providing an electronic copy of the Domestic 
Security Enhancement Act of 2003 (Confidential Draft Jan 9, 2003)). In the 
Act’s “Section by Section Analysis,” the Handschu Settlement is mentioned by 
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III. HANDSCHU REMAINS VITAL 
Accepting that Handschu’s protection of an individual’s First 
and Fourth Amendment rights hinders the NYPD’s ability to 
fight terrorism requires accepting the following difficult 
proposition, which should be rejected: the political views of 
dissenters raise suspicion of terrorism.143 It was predictable that 
the police would invoke the stressfulness of the current climate to 
modify the decree and use modification as a cover for an interest 
in suppressing dissent.144 But, contrary to the defendants’ 
                                                          
name: 
During the 1970s and 1980s, some law enforcement agencies-e.g., 
the New York City Police Department-entered consent decrees that 
limit such agencies from gathering information about organizations 
and individuals that may be engaged in terrorist activities and other 
criminal wrongdoing. See, e.g., Handschu . . . . As a result, they 
lack the ability to use the full range of investigative techniques that 
are lawful under the Constitution, and that are available to the FBI. 
(For example, the Attorney General’s investigative guidelines 
authorize agents, subject to certain restrictions, to attend public places 
and events “on the same terms and conditions as members of the 
public generally.”) The consent decrees also handicap officers in their 
efforts to share information with other law enforcement agencies, 
including federal law enforcement agencies such as the FBI. These 
problems threaten to frustrate the operations of the federal-state-local 
Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and could prevent effective cooperation 
at all levels of government in antiterrorism efforts. . . . This proposal 
would discontinue most consent decrees that could impede terrorism 
investigations conducted by federal, state or local law enforcement 
agencies. It would immediately terminate most decrees that were 
enacted before September 11, 2001 (including New York City’s). All 
surviving decrees would have to be necessary to correct a current and 
ongoing violation of a Federal right, extend no further than necessary 
to correct the violation of the Federal right, and be narrowly drawn 
and the least intrusive means to correct the violation. 
Domestic Security Enhancement Act, Section by Section Analysis: Section 
312: Appropriate Remedies with Respect to Law Enforcement Surveillance 
Activities, at (Confidential Draft Jan. 9, 2003). 
143 See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing link between political activity and 
terrorism). 
144 See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing government use of stressful times to 
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arguments and the court’s determination, changes in 
circumstances since September 11 with respect to the consent 
decree are not sufficient to require modification.145 Ultimately, 
the modifications impermissibly seek the constitutional floor, risk 
constitutional violations and are not tailored to any changed 
circumstances.146 
A. Analysis and Arguments in Context 
In times of relative societal calm, courts should seek to 
protect fundamental constitutional rights, such as those protected 
by the First Amendment, that come under harsh attack in 
“pathological” times.147 Vigorous protection of these rights in 
times of calm provides greater stability for the future.148 This is 
particularly necessary because in stressful times the courts will be 
constrained in their ability to monitor concentrations of executive 
power.149 To be sure, it is difficult to pin down exactly when 
                                                          
suppress dissent). 
145 See infra Part III.A.2 (arguing that modifying decree cannot be shown 
to assist with preventing terrorism). 
146 See infra Part III.A.2 (arguing that defendants’ arguments cannot 
justify modifications). 
147 See Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First 
Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 456, 459-62 (1985) (arguing that the 
doctrine surrounding certain core constitutional rights, and specifically the 
First Amendment, ought to be formulated with an eye toward pathological 
time periods). Professor Blasi defines pathology as a “social phenomenon, 
characterized by a notable shift in attitudes regarding the tolerance of 
unorthodox ideas. What makes a period pathological is [an increased] 
likelihood that people who hold unorthodox views will be punished for what 
they say or believe.” Id. at 450. This note employs Blasi’s formulation for 
analytical purposes. 
148 Id. at 512. This is because the strength of constitutional ideals is most 
severely tested in pathological times, and if those ideals had solid grounding in 
other times they would be more robust when tested. Id. at 456. 
149 Id. at 507; see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 
(1944) (upholding as constitutional a military wartime decision to round up 
and detain people of Japanese descent); Eric L. Muller, All the Themes but 
One, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1395 (1999) (reviewing WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 
ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (1998) and 
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pathological times are upon us.150 The years leading up to World 
War I, the years of World War II and the McCarthy era are 
generally considered exemplary pathological times.151 The year 
following September 11, 2001, could also be included.152 Since 
September 11, vulnerable constitutional rights have been under 
attack and society has not tolerated dissent.153 Intolerance of 
                                                          
commenting on Chief Justice Rehnquist’s belief that it is not of concern that in 
times of national security crisis, civil liberties suffer); Anthony Lewis, 
Marbury v. Madison v. Ashcroft, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2003, at A17 
(recognizing that the Supreme Court “disappointed us” when it refused to 
interfere with the internment of Japanese Americans, and that judges cannot 
“close their eyes to violations of our rights” during a possibly endless war on 
terrorism). There is something of an inverse relationship between executive 
power and civil liberties: civil liberties contract as executive power expands, 
and vice versa. 
150 See Blasi, supra note 147, at 466. 
151 See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 
329 (Douglas, J, concurring). Referring to “the flood of cases before us this 
term . . . we are currently in the throes of another national seizure of 
paranoia, resembling the hysteria which surrounded the Alien and Sedition 
Acts, the Palmer Raids, and the McCarthy era.” Id. 
152 Blasi, supra note 147, at 464 (citing examples of events that precipitate 
a pathological period outside of the most natural example of a nation going to 
war). Among those are “a sudden disturbance of a comfortable way of life” or 
“[v]ivid reminders of a group’s or nation’s vulnerability.” Id.; see also Bush 
Speaks of Security To Group of U.S. Attorneys, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, 
at B7. “But we’re at war. The enemy has declared war on us. They . . . seek 
to destroy our country and our way of life.” Id. (quoting President George W. 
Bush). 
153 See, e.g., Hearing on Anti-Terrorism Policy Before the Senate Jud. 
Comm., 106th Cong. (Dec. 6, 2001) (testimony of Attorney General John 
Ashcroft, who said, “[T]o those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms 
of lost liberty . . . your tactics only aid terrorists.”), quoted in David Cole, 
Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2002) (arguing that it is the liberty of 
non-citizens, not the liberty of citizens, that Americans have been historically, 
and are now even more willing, to give up); David Glenn, The War on 
Campus: Will Academic Freedom Survive?, THE NATION, Dec. 3, 2001 
(discussing pressures put on professors at the University of New Mexico and 
UNC-Chapel Hill, a library assistant at UCLA, and condemnation of teach-ins 
at CUNY, all for academic commentary about the U.S. response to September 
11); Bill Pennington, Player’s Protest Over the Flag Divides Fans, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 26, 2003, at D1 (reporting that a college basketball player’s act 
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dissent is a distinctive feature of pathological periods.154 
Discussing the pathology of these times requires recognizing 
that periods of heightened national security do not become so 
without some influence from the government.155 In other words, 
compliant mass media that parrots the official story provided by 
government sources contribute to national hysteria.156 This 
                                                          
of facing away from the flag during the national anthem made her a 
controversial figure); Bill Berkowitz, Academic Bashing, at ZNET, 
http://www.zmag.org/znet.html (Nov. 6, 2002) (discussing the new study of 
university faculty by the American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA) 
and recognizing effort to label university professors as anti-American where 
they question governmental policy). ACTA was founded by Lynn Cheney and 
Senator Joseph Lieberman in 1995. Id. The report condemns university faculty 
as being the “weak link” in America’s response to terrorism. Id. Such a report 
seeks to stifle dissenting voices on campus and everywhere by listing those 
that seriously consider government policy. Id. 
154 Blasi, supra note 147, at 457 (noting that “[t]he aggressive impulse to 
be intolerant of others resides within all of us”). “It is a powerful instinct. . . . 
When the constraints imposed by [socialized norms about the value of free 
speech] lose their effectiveness . . . the power of the instinct toward 
intolerance usually generates a highly charged collective mentality.” Id. The 
constraints on this aggressive intolerance are removed in stressful times, and 
“the problem is compounded by the fact that the suppression of dissent 
[manifests itself] in the guise of political affirmation, of insisting that everyone 
stand up and be counted in favor of the supposed true values of the political 
community.” Id. at 457-58; see also United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 
1074, 1079 (E.D. Mich. 1971) (recognizing the influence of the stressfulness 
of the Vietnam era on the public). “In this turbulent time of unrest, it is often 
difficult for the established and contented members of our society to tolerate, 
much less try to understand [the views of political opponents of the 
government].” Id. 
155 Interview by Znet with Robert McChesney & John Nichols, ZNET, 
Nov. 6, 2002 (discussing their recent book explaining the struggle between 
free and independent press which serves the people on the one hand and 
concentrated corporate media subservient to power on the other), 
http://www.zmag.org/znet.html. For a detailed analysis of powerful interests 
shaping information, see generally EDWARD S. HERMAN & NOAM CHOMSKY, 
MANUFACTURING CONSENT (1988) (establishing a model for understanding 
how information contrary to the needs of powerful institutions is suppressed 
and controlled in a democracy and applying that model to news stories of the 
1970s and 1980s). 
156 See HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note 155, at 18-23 (recognizing elite 
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deference benefits those in power when the media ignore and 
suppress stories that conflict with governmental interests.157 
History predicts that government actors will invoke the 
stressfulness of a climate to justify abuses or extraordinary 
exercises of power.158 Indeed, in their request to modify the 
                                                          
influence on mass media). This contention, that media is subservient to the 
interests of power, allows for some contrary evidence. Thus, articles 
occasionally appear in mainstream publications the content of which may seem 
to undermine views routinely espoused in those publications. Id. This theory 
may explain how the majority of news coverage of the war on terrorism 
examines both the U.S. vulnerability to terrorism and a high-ranking U.S. 
military official’s contrary opinion. See, e.g., Eric Schmitt & Philip Shenon, 
General Sees Scant Evidence of Close Threat in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 
2002, at A26 (noting that the head of the military’s Northern Command, four 
star General Ralph E. Eberhart, who oversees domestic counterterrorism 
efforts, does not consider threat of terrorism to be “significant”). 
157 HERMAN & CHOMSKY, supra note 155, at 26-28. Noting the 
institutional attributes of media does not dismiss the public’s legitimate 
concerns about safety or security; it merely points out that those concerns can 
be driven to some extent by reporting and repetition of certain stories and how 
those stories are framed. Id. at 23. It is beyond the scope of this note to 
conduct an empirical analysis of news stories that dealt with the September 11 
events with respect to their content and omissions. For readers interested in 
news ignored by mainstream media, see, e.g., Censored 2003: Top 25 
Censored Stories of 2001-2002, http://www.projectcensored.org/stories/2003/ 
default.htm (Mar. 23, 2003) (listing top stories not reported or underreported, 
including U.S. efforts that could be considered terrorism). 
158 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218 (1944) 
(recognizing the threat of invasion by Japan during World War II to justify 
internment of Japanese-Americans). The Court noted: 
All citizens . . . feel the impact of war in greater or lesser measure. 
Citizenship has its responsibilities as well as its privileges, and in 
time of war the burden is always heavier. Compulsory exclusion of 
large groups of citizens from their homes, except under circumstances 
of direst emergency and peril, is inconsistent with our basic 
governmental institutions. But when under conditions of modern 
warfare our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to 
protect must be commensurate with the threatened danger. 
Id. at 219-20. During World War I, the post office took away the use of the 
mail for publications that printed antiwar articles. See HOWARD ZINN, A 
PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 360 (1994). The Department of 
Justice raided dozens of union meeting halls and seized documents later used 
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Handschu Settlement defendants’ posited that times are different 
now than in the past.159 Their actions demonstrate a predictable 
attempt to take advantage of this pathological period.160 
1. District Court Modification 
In his decision to modify Handschu, Judge Haight focused on 
the undisputed assertion in defendants’ papers that the conspiracy 
to bomb the World Trade Center in 1993 was coordinated by an 
imam.161 The court concluded that the defendants had met their 
burden of showing that the settlement may impose restrictions on 
the police because the plaintiffs could not show that terrorists 
would never participate in lawful political or religious activities 
or organizations.162 It is impossible, however, to contend that 
terrorists never participate in lawful activities. The court 
                                                          
in trials for conspiracy to “hinder the draft [and] encourage desertion.” Id. at 
363-64. And the New York Times quoted a former Secretary of War as saying: 
“We must have no criticism now.” Id. at 359. Thus, from U.S. Solicitor 
General Theodore Olson:  
When you have a long period of time when you’re not engaged in a 
war, people tend to forget, or put in the backs of their minds, the 
necessity for certain types of government action used when we are in 
danger, when we are facing eyeball to eyeball a serious threat. 
Charles Lane, Parallel Legal Unit to Handle ‘Enemy Combatants,’ DAILY 
GAZETTE (Schenectady), Dec. 1, 2002, at A13 (quoting the Solicitor General 
in reference to the war on terror). 
159 See Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 12 (“When the Handschu 
Guidelines were agreed to in 1985, the NYPD had no conception of the 
challenge it would face in protecting the City and its people from international 
terrorism”). 
160 See Arundhati Roy, Come September, Speech at the Lensic 
Performance Arts Center, Santa Fe, New Mexico, ZNET (Sept. 29, 2002) 
(condemning the use of September 11 grief for political purpose as a “terrible, 
violent thing for a State to do its people”), at http://www.zmag.org/content/ 
showarticle.cfm?itemID=2404&sectionID=15; see also supra note 158 
(noting examples of government abuse during stressful times). 
161 See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203, 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2134 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003); see also supra Part II.B.2 
(describing the decision to grant modification). 
162 Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, at *33. 
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correctly used the example of the notable imam as proof that 
lawful political or religious activity has been used as a cover for 
preparation of terrorist attacks.163 But reliance on this notion 
raises the important question of what one should do with such 
knowledge. Judge Haight’s argument allows for a dangerous 
assumption and illegitimate next step: that political activity itself 
becomes suspect in terrorism investigations simply because there 
is crossover, at times, between lawful political or religious 
activity and terrorist preparation.164 The real import of the 
decision is that because protected political activity once crossed 
paths with terrorist planning, political activity now can be 
deemed a specific indication that criminal activity will or is 
threatening to occur.165 Political activity thus can be said to raise 
criminal suspicion. 
                                                          
163 Id. But see Andy Newman & Daryl Khan, Brooklyn Mosque Becomes 
Terror Icon, but Federal Case is Unclear, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2003, at 29 
(noting that certain infamy has surrounded a Brooklyn mosque with accused 
links to raising money for terrorism). 
164 Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, at *34-35 (requiring that 
plaintiffs show that terrorists “have never engaged in . . . or will never in the 
future [engage in political activity]”). The court reasoned that the breadth of 
the plaintiff class necessitated the finding of a possible relationship between 
political activities undertaken by the members of the plaintiff class and those 
undertaken by terrorists. Id. at *34. Thus, the court determined that the 
settlement’s restrictions on investigation of political activity may inadvertently 
restrict the NYPD’s investigations of terrorism. Id. at *35. This note contends 
that by focusing on the relationship between political activity and terrorist 
activity without factoring in criminal activity whatsoever, the Handschu 
Settlement modification creates a single-factor test for determining the 
existence of suspected terrorist activity: political activity.  
165 See, e.g., Mari J. Matsuda, Foreward: McCarthyism, the Internment 
and the Contradictions of Power, 19 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 9, 17-18 (1998) 
(recognizing, in a discussion of how Japanese-Americans were vilified during 
World War II, that “[a]s with the threat of terrorism today, as with the 
mysterious Communists that McCarthyism searched for, the lack of evidence 
against the accused Japanese Americans became an additional solipsistic 
reason to violate their rights: there was no other way to fight such a hidden 
threat”). 
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2. Defendants’ Arguments 
Defendants sought and obtained removal of the “criminal 
activity requirement.”166 Removing the requirement that 
investigations are based on suspected criminal activity eliminates 
the underlying reason for the settlement.167 After modification, 
the Authority no longer approves investigations based on whether 
it considers officers to have sufficient basis to determine that 
there is a crime to investigate.168 Thus, the only role for the 
Authority is to investigate violations of the constitution.169 This is 
an evisceration of the decree.170 
The NYPD should not be permitted to avoid the requirement 
that their investigations be based on specific information of 
criminal activity. It is reasonable to require that virtually all 
police investigations start with information that criminal activity 
is afoot. In the absence of criminal activity, it follows to ask what 
other factors are to be used as a basis for investigations. Neither 
Judge Haight nor the NYPD specified the factors on which the 
police would rely to begin investigations in the absence of 
criminal activity.171 The defendants referred to “lawful 
                                                          
166 See Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, at *63; Defs.’ Mem. of 
Law, supra note 5, at 14. 
167 See Anderson, supra note 11, at 729 (noting that the success of a 
consent decree is contingent upon “preserving the spirit” of consent that 
attended its creation); Chevigny, supra note 6, at 737 (noting that the relief 
sought in complaints of police surveillance was control of such surveillance in 
non-criminal contexts). 
168 See Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 20 (“Under [the] 
modification, the Authority . . . retain[s] a role in monitoring compliance with 
the core policy of the decree: that police investigations ‘conform to 
constitutionally guaranteed rights and privileges’”). 
169 Id. at 20-21. 
170 See, e.g., Flynn & Fries, supra note 5, at A18 (reporting plaintiffs’ 
counsel as saying police were trying to undo the settlement). 
171 See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, 
*36-37 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003) (finding no reason to doubt the defendants’ 
assertion that the criminal activity requirement inhibits terrorism investigations 
but recognizing no other factor upon which police could rely to commence an 
investigation). 
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preparatory activities” of potential targets that may indicate 
conduct pinpointing terrorists: “They may own homes, live in 
communities with families, belong to religious or social 
organizations and attend educational institutions.”172 If the NYPD 
considers these activities suspicious, then a government 
“dragnet” has been realized,173 and the NYPD apparently now 
assumes that otherwise lawful actors are suspicious potential 
terrorists.174 This suspicion, however, must arise from 
something.175 Regrettably, in the current climate it is reasonable 
to fear that merely espousing opinions unpopular to those in 
power may create suspicion.176 
a. The Change in Contemporary Circumstances Does Not 
Satisfy the Rufo Analysis 
Defendants’ argument that “circumstances have changed” is 
similar to those previously offered by the government to defend 
                                                          
172 See Cohen Decl., supra note 115, at 9. 
173 See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 327 
(1972) (Douglas, J., concurring) (stating that the Fourth Amendment protects 
against “dragnet techniques”). 
174 Cohen Decl., supra note 115, at 9. 
175 See ARTHUR KINOY, RIGHTS ON TRIAL 21-25 (1994). Silence on the 
factors police use to determine suspicion when they are not required to show 
specific information of criminal activity or the threat of criminal activity 
recalls the government’s “trust the integrity of the executive” argument. Id. 
(discussing the government’s oral argument in United States v. United States 
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297). 
176 For examples of conduct that the NYPD has deemed suspicious in the 
past, see Handschu v. Special Serices Division, 131 F.R.D. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 
1989) (discussing investigation of civil rights group); People v. Collier, 376 
N.Y.S.2d 954, 961-63 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (discussing investigation of community 
activist); Murphy Aff., supra note 57 (discussing the police activities that led 
to the adoption of the settlement); supra notes 57-58 (same). For examples of 
what the Chicago police and the U.S. government consider suspicious, see 
Frank Main, Police to Videotape Protesters, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Nov. 7, 
2002, at 6 (discussing Chicago police surveillance of social justice activists); 
Dave Lindorff, Grounded, SALON (Nov. 15, 2002) (discussing the federal 
government’s list of people it does not want to fly, which includes peace 
activists), at http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2002/11/15/no_fly.html. 
STEIGMANMACRO.DOC 6/25/03 5:06 PM 
780 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
suspect executive action.177 For example, in United States v. 
United States District Court the government argued that times 
were dangerous and thus necessitated government actions to 
defend itself.178 The case involved individuals attempting to 
review government wiretaps of their conversations to determine 
whether their indictments were based on illegally obtained 
evidence.179 The government posited that electronic monitoring of 
the defendants’ conversations without a warrant was lawful.180 
                                                          
177 See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972) 
(forcing discovery of the source of information the U.S. government was 
using to charge defendants with conspiracy to, inter alia, illegally sabotage an 
Ann Arbor Central Intelligence Agency office). In United States v. United 
States District Court, the government had proffered the constitutionally 
unsound argument that the President of the United States, acting through the 
Attorney General, possessed inherent executive powers to authorize wiretaps 
of domestic groups without first obtaining a warrant. Id. at 299-300; infra Part 
II.B.2 (discussing defendants arguments). See also David Edwards, Unique 
Threats, Profitable Responses, MEDIA LENS (2002) (demonstrating that there 
was a “unique” threat posed by the Soviet Union in the 1950s, by international 
terrorism in the 1980s, and by Iraq today), republished in ZNET, 
http://www.zmag.org/znet.html (Nov. 6, 2002). 
178 407 U.S. at 311-13 (noting that the government was concerned with 
“threats and acts of sabotage”). See also KINOY, supra note 175, at 21-25 
(describing the arguments raised by the U.S. in the papers and to the Supreme 
Court). As reason for supporting a domestic security exemption to the warrant 
requirement, the government cited historical laws that reflected fear of 
domestic violence and rebellion as well as the Presidential oath of office and 
told the Court that it had to rely on the “integrity of the Executive branch.” 
Id. at 22, 24. The Handschu defendants’ argument was the same: times are 
dangerous, which creates the necessity of unfettered police conduct. See supra 
Part II.B (discussing defendant’s requested modifications). 
179 United States v. Sinclair, 321 F. Supp. 1074, 1076 (E.D. Mich. 1971) 
(ordering the government to make full disclosure to the defendant of 
monitored conversations). 
180 Id. Recognizing that the Supreme Court had not ruled on the validity 
of the government’s position that the government should be able to determine 
unilaterally whether a given situation concerned national security, the district 
court noted that “[w]e are a country of laws and not of men,” id., and warned: 
An idea which seems to permeate much of the [g]overnment’s 
argument is that a dissident domestic organization is akin to an 
unfriendly foreign power and must be dealt with in the same fashion. 
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Justice Powell noted: 
History abundantly documents the tendency of 
Government—however benevolent and benign its 
motives—to view with suspicion those who most fervently 
dispute its policies. [Constitutional] protections become 
the more necessary when the targets of official 
surveillance may be those suspected of unorthodoxy in 
their political beliefs. The danger to political dissent is 
acute where the Government attempts to act under so 
vague a concept as the power to protect “domestic 
security.”181 
The argument that times are dangerous should fail now for 
the same reasons it failed then.182 Domestic security concerns 
were invoked in the 1970s in the same manner that terrorism is 
today.183 But citing the specter of terrorism, as with domestic 
security, inadequately supports the government’s drastic plea to 
                                                          
There is great danger in an argument of this nature for it strikes at the 
very constitutional privileges and immunities that are inherent in . . . 
citizenship. It is to be remembered that in our democracy all men are 
to receive equal justice regardless of their political beliefs or 
persuasions. 
Id. at 1079. 
181 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 314. For 
example, in the years preceding and during World War I, nine hundred people 
went to prison under the Espionage Act. See ZINN, supra note 158, at 356-59. 
182  United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 318-19 
(recognizing that the government cannot simply invoke national security to 
justify exercising power to, in effect, suspend the constitution whenever it 
deems appropriate). The Court also rejected the government’s argument that 
the issues were too complex for the judiciary to handle. Id. at 320. 
183 Compare id. at 320 (“Security surveillances are especially sensitive 
because of the inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept, the 
necessarily broad and continuing nature of intelligence gathering, and the 
temptation to utilize surveillances to oversee political dissent.”), with 
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
2134 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003) (acknowledging defendants’ argument that the 
restrictions are inconsistent with the public interest because of the threat of 
terrorism). 
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eviscerate the Handschu Settlement.184 Indeed, “the recurring 
desire of reigning officials to employ dragnet techniques to 
intimidate their critics lies at the core of . . . [Fourth 
Amendment] prohibition[s].”185 
It can be argued that dedicating resources to preventing 
terrorist attacks is a necessary police action after September 11, 
especially in New York.186 Some commentators have advocated 
government use of military force where local law enforcement is 
overmatched.187 The media bombarded the public in the past year 
with suggestions that the intelligence community did not perform 
its function to prevent the terrorist attacks of 2001.188 But neither 
                                                          
184 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. at 320. 
185 Id. at 327 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas recognized that 
“such excesses as the use of general warrants and the writs of assistance . . . 
led to the ratification of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. 
186 William K. Rashbaum, Kelly Seeking Federal Money for City Police, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002, at B1 (reporting that police asked the federal 
government for funds to allay the cost of the NYPD’s counterterrorism 
efforts). The NYPD has approximately one thousand officers devoted to 
working on terrorism. Id. 
187 David A. Klinger & Dave Grossman, Responses to the September 11 
Attacks: Who should Deal with Foreign Terrorists on U.S. Soil?: Socio-Legal 
Consequences of September 11 and the Ongoing Threat of Terrorist Attacks in 
America, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 815, 823 (2002) (arguing that since 
local law enforcement is overmatched in dealing with terrorist threats, perhaps 
some consideration should be given to lifting the two hundred year ban on 
U.S. military involvement in local law enforcement). Klinger & Grossman 
describe an updated and fanciful version of the LAPD shootout with the 
Symbionese Liberation Army (SLA), with a much better armed and trained Al 
Qaeda in the SLA’s former role. Id. at 824-25. But see Schmitt & Shenon, 
supra note 156 (discussing the comments of an officer who does not consider 
the threats against the U.S. to be significant). General Eberhart recognized 
that “[o]ur basic freedoms must be protected” and that the country had “to 
make sure that we’re not out there doing . . . some of the things we did in the 
‘50s with McCarthyism . . . [,] a very sad chapter in our history.” Id. 
188 See, e.g., Jan C. Ting, Unobjectionable but Insufficient–Federal 
Initiatives in Response to the September 11 Terrorist Attacks, 34 CONN. L. 
REV. 1145, 1148 (2002) (commenting that the USA PATRIOT Act itself was 
promulgated because of intelligence failures); Allison Mitchell & Todd S. 
Purdum, A Nation Challenged: The Congress; Lawmakers Seek Inquiry Into 
Intelligence Failures, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2001, at A1; David E. Sanger, 
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a perceived need to allocate resources nor the discussion of 
intelligence failures justify removing the safeguards of the 
Handschu Settlement. Handschu was concerned with government 
intrusion on lawful political activity, not legitimate investigations 
by local law enforcement of activities that can be shown to be 
criminal.189 Considering the settlement provisions, it is difficult to 
understand how this seemingly innocuous framework could be 
considered to hinder police work.190 In fact, plaintiffs’ counsel 
recently described the agreement as not particularly stringent in 
terms of what the police are required to show to conduct an 
investigation.191 
Defendants cannot establish the necessary connection between 
lawful political activity and terrorism.192 This is because any 
                                                          
Bush Was Warned Bin Laden Wanted To Hijack Planes, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 
2002, at A1; Philip Shenon, Traces of Terrorism: The Warnings; F.B.I. Knew 
for Years About Terror Pilot Training, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2002, at A1.  
189 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1420 (S.D.N.Y. 
1985) (establishing settlement guidelines for the purpose of regulating 
investigations of political activity). Political activity is the “exercise of a right 
or expression or association for the purpose of maintaining or changing 
governmental policies or social conditions.” Id. 
190 See supra Part II.A (discussing settlement provisions). 
191 See Perrotta, Police Ask Court to View Secret Papers, supra note 107 
(quoting plaintiffs’ counsel as describing the original agreement as a relatively 
“low hurdle” because a showing of specific information is a lower threshold 
than reasonable suspicion); Chevigny, supra note 6, at 765 n.200 (recognizing 
differing views on whether specific information is any different from 
reasonable suspicion). See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) 
(defining reasonable suspicion as requiring an officer to “be able to point to 
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warrant” an intrusion). 
192 See, e.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Says 
Rewriting of Domestic Spying Restrictions Gives FBI New Powers Despite 
Growing Evidence of Analytical Failures (May 30, 2002) (noting that 
rewriting the FBI’s guidelines on domestic spying “will do little to make us 
safer but will inevitably make us less free”), available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
NationalSecurity/NationalSecurity.cfm; see also Cole, supra note 153, at 999-
1000 (discussing the role of citizenship in historic assaults on civil liberties). 
The government in American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee v. Reno, 70 
F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d, Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
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logical connection between the city’s interest in preventing future 
attacks and spying on domestic political groups is tenuous as 
best.193 Lawful political activity usually has nothing to do with 
planning or designing terrorist acts.194 One example from the FBI 
Guidelines illustrates a situation where lawful activities might 
lead to terrorism suspicion: an urban organization’s attempt to 
purchase vast amounts of fertilizer or other combustible agents.195 
According to the guidelines, this presumptively raises suspicion 
to investigate a particular group.196 The political or religious 
nature of this hypothetical group cannot raise suspicion.197 
                                                          
Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471 (1998), argued that in order to deport 
non-citizens they should only have to show association with and support of a 
terrorist group and not that any of the individual’s conduct assisted terrorist 
activity. Cole, supra note 153, at 999-1000. The Ninth Circuit, rejecting the 
argument, held that the First Amendment protected both citizens and aliens 
alike in this regard. Id. Subsequent legislation reversed federal court 
jurisdiction over this type of claim by a noncitizen. Id. 
193 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, How “Patriot Act 2” 
Would Further Erode the Basic Checks on Government Power That Keep 
America Safe and Free (Mar. 20, 2003) (establishing the falsity of the claim 
that it is necessary to undermine civil liberties in order to effectuate safety), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/SafeandFree/SafeandFree.cfm?ID=12161&c 
=206. 
194 See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203, 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2134 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003) (explaining that acts of peaceful 
civil disobedience are not terrorism). The government’s reply to this 
contention would most likely be that some lawful political activity may 
develop into planning terrorist acts. The response must be that if this is so, 
only strict oversight can ensure a minimum of abuse in investigations. 
Moreover, assuming its resources are scarce, the government has an interest in 
focusing its investigations where it is most confident they will yield results. 
See Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, How “Patriot Act 2” 
Would Further Erode the Basic Checks on Government Power That Keep 
America Safe and Free, supra note 193 (recognizing that scarce resources 
should drive investigations to focus on actual potential threats). 
195 FBI Guidelines, supra note 136, at 2 (noting that where groups attempt 
to acquire toxic chemicals, without apparent reason, an investigation may be 
justified). 
196 Id. 
197 See Cole, supra note 153, at 1003 (noting that using political or 
religious affiliations to determine guilt bypasses the procedures that are in 
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Rather, the attempted purchase is specific information of criminal 
or threatened activity.198 If the mere political nature of a group 
raises suspicion, the predictable result is simply that dissenters—
those with unpopular ideas—will be viewed as suspicious.199 
Blurring the lines between lawful political activity and 
terrorism constitutes an implicit government effort to link actual 
terrorists on the one hand and political dissenters on the other.200 
Over the past year, government officials have sought to establish 
a this link,201 but the link, to the extent that it can be established, 
serves only to justify the government’s desire to reinstate 
surveillance of activists and dissenters. Political dissent, 
however, should be a protected activity any time “our way of 
life” is threatened.202 Although political groups unpopular with 
                                                          
place to distinguish the guilty from the innocent). 
198 FBI Guidelines, supra note 136, at 2. 
199 See Cole, supra note 153, at 994-95 (recognizing that early targets of 
government harassment were alien union members that were critical of 
capitalism). Cole warns that “[o]nce again, we are treating people as 
suspicious not for their conduct, but based on their racial, ethnic, or political 
identity.” Id. at 1003. 
200 For example, the federal government has a list of people, including 
peace activists and civil libertarians, who are subjected to scrutiny and 
harassment when they attempt to fly. See Lindorff, supra note 176 (discussing 
a alleged government no-fly list). The list was acknowledged by the U.S. 
Transportation Security Administration and has resulted in the airport 
harassment of a Milwaukee nun heading to a peace conference. Id. This link 
has also been implicitly established by other commentators. See Klinger & 
Grossman, supra note 188, at 824-25 (analogizing the SLA shootout, which 
involved radical government activists, to a hypothetical shootout with Al 
Qaeda).  
201 D.T. Max, The Making of the Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2001, at 
32 (quoting President Bush as saying, “You’re either with us, or with the 
terrorists.”).  
202 See Bush Speaks of Security, supra note 152. See also Press Release, 
American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Appalled by Ashcroft Statement on 
Dissent; Calls Free Speech “Main Engine of Justice” (Dec. 10, 2001) 
(statement of Laura W. Murphy, director of the ACLU’s national office in 
Washington, D.C., that a lesson from the history of dissent is “that free and 
robust debate is one of the main engines of social and political justice. . . . 
[D]ebate only strengthens our government [by providing legitimacy to its 
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those in power are not necessarily terrorists, given the 
opportunity and the cover of legitimacy, government officials 
will naturally focus their attention on dissenters.203 But neither 
local law enforcement nor societal needs will be met by silencing 
dissent, and suppressing these voices will make New York 
inhospitable to the lawful activity of groups concerned about 
government action.204  
The Handschu Settlement was a natural target for exploitation 
in a stressful time.205 The police argued that the present situation 
is grave and that removing procedural safeguards from their 
investigations was a necessary precaution.206 Without more, 
however, this argument is unavailing. Justice Douglas noted 
more than thirty years ago that “[w]hen the Executive attempts to 
excuse these tactics as essential to its defense against internal 
subversion, we are obliged to remind it, without apology, of this 
Court’s long commitment to the preservation of the Bill of Rights 
from the corrosive environment of precisely such expedients.”207 
Moreover, a variety of situations can be deemed to create a 
                                                          
actions] in this time of national crisis”), available at http://www.aclu.org/ 
FreeSpeech.cfm. 
203 See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314 
(1972) (recognizing government tendency to focus on dissenters). 
204 This observation is supported by the events that prompted the 
Handschu Settlement in the first place. See supra Part II (describing 
background events to the settlement). The terms of the settlement reveal that 
residents’ interests are better served by limiting law enforcement capacity to 
muffle dissent. See supra Part II.A (describing terms of the settlement). See 
also Leonard Levitt, No Connection to Intelligence, NEWSDAY, Sept. 30, 2002 
at A12 (reporting the motion’s lack of evidence that abrogating the Handschu 
Settlement would in any way assist the NYPD in fighting terrorism); Flynn & 
Fries, supra note 5 (reporting that police contend modification of Handschu 
warranted by change in circumstances). 
205 See, e.g., John Barlow Weiner, Note, Institutional Reform Consent 
Decrees as Conservers of Social Progress, 27 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
355 (1996). 
206 Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 13-14. See also Cole, supra 
note 153, at 955. 
207 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 331 (1972) 
(Douglas, J., concurring). 
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heightened sense of national security.208 And, the United States is 
constantly conducting military operations against various 
countries and enemies.209 Thus, an argument that points to a time 
of war or grave danger becomes all-inclusive. Judge Haight 
relied almost entirely on the notion that changes to the world are 
“perfectly apparent” in his decision to modify the Handschu 
Settlement.210 The NYPD is justifiably concerned about the safety 
of New Yorkers.211 Nevertheless, the safety of New Yorkers can 
be protected without removing the restrictions on police activity 
obtained by the Handschu litigants.212 Safety of residents and 
citizenry depends as much on the free and open exchange of ideas 
as it does on physical protection.213 Removing procedural 
                                                          
208 See, e.g., Zoltan Grossman, From Wounded Knee to Afghanistan: A 
Century of US Military Interventions, ZNET, at http://www.zmag.org/list2. 
htm (Oct. 8, 2001) (demonstrating, even with an incomplete list, that there has 
been virtually unceasing U.S. military activities since 1890). See also Noam 
Chomsky, Terror and Just Response, ZNET, at http://www.zmag.org/znet/htm 
(Aug. 1, 2002) (itemizing U.S. military operations, including the war against 
Nicaragua, the invasion of Panama in 1989, and the bombing of the Sudan in 
1998, and those of its clients and allies, that when applying a non-
controversial definition of terrorism, qualify as terrorism). 
209 Grossman, supra note 208. 
210 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2134 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003). 
211 NYPD Mission Statement, available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ 
nypd/html/mission.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2003). “The Mission of the New 
York City Police Department is to enhance the quality of life in our City by 
working in partnership with the community and in accordance with 
constitutional rights to enforce the laws, preserve the peace, reduce fear, and 
provide for a safe environment.” Id. 
212 See, e.g., CHALMERS JOHNSON, BLOWBACK: THE COSTS AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF AMERICAN EMPIRE (2000) (arguing that American foreign 
policy activities that hurt people worldwide make terrorist attacks predictable 
and that some changes in foreign policy would likely result in reducing the 
threat of terrorism); see also supra Part II.A (discussing the terms of the 
settlement). 
213 See, e.g., United States v. Goba, 220 F. Supp. 2d 182, 184 
(W.D.N.Y. 2002) (recognizing at the outset of proceedings against an alleged 
terrorist group in Buffalo, New York, that constitutional protections and 
concepts of American democracy provide “sufficient strength and protection to 
STEIGMANMACRO.DOC 6/25/03 5:06 PM 
788 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
safeguards in government surveillance techniques cannot be 
proven to lead to an increase in security.214 
b. Seeking the Constitutional Floor 
Defendants’ modification maintained the existence of the 
Authority.215 Arguably, the Authority was maintained solely for 
the purpose of not violating the Rufo requirement that any 
modification not seek the constitutional floor.216 But its mere 
existence does not necessarily keep the defendants above the 
constitutional floor.217 Indeed, a strong argument exists that the 
Handschu defendants, beyond just seeking the constitutional 
                                                          
bring citizens to justice without weakening our security”); Press Release, 
American Civil Liberties Union, Threats to Civil Liberties Post-September 11: 
Secrecy, Erosion of Privacy, Danger of Unchecked Government (Dec. 14, 
2001) (statement of Gregory T. Nojeim, associate director of the ACLU’s 
national office in Washington, D.C., noting that American democracy is “a 
political system based on the ideas of transparency and accountability”), 
available at http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/NationalSecurity.cfm?ID= 
9857&c=24. 
214 See, e.g., Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU 
Appalled by Ashcroft Statement, supra note 204 (disagreeing with the 
Attorney General that “domestic debate about the government response in any 
way harms the investigation”); see also Press Release, American Civil 
Liberties Union, ACLU Says Rewriting of Domestic Spying Restrictions 
Gives FBI New Powers, supra note 193 (recognizing that the FBI Guidelines, 
which provide for investigation upon a showing of a law enforcement purpose, 
will allow the government to gather even more of information it has shown it 
has difficulty analyzing). 
215 See supra Part II.B.2 (describing modifications of the Handschu 
Settlement and the role of the Authority after modification). See also 
Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134, *50-51 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003) (considering the existence of the Authority and the 
incorporation of the FBI Guidelines into the patrol guide as sufficient to keep 
defendants above the constitutional floor). 
216 See supra Part I (discussing the requirements of consent decree 
modification). 
217 See supra Part I (discussing the requirements of consent decree 
modification). It further allows them to suggest that they are not perpetuating a 
constitutional violation. See supra Part I (discussing the requirements of 
consent decree modification). 
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floor, actually risked creating or perpetuating a constitutional 
violation.218 
Citing Laird v. Tatum,219 which agreed with the government 
that the United States Army’s program of domestic surveillance 
was not, in itself, a harm that could be redressed, the Handschu 
defendants claimed that the existence of a domestic surveillance 
program alone is not redressable harm.220 This proposition, 
however, was qualified by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Meese v. Keene,221 which held that government harm to a 
plaintiff’s reputation is cognizable.222 Consequently, courts are 
willing to review the constitutionality of government surveillance 
that harms an individual’s reputation or opportunity for 
employment.223 Thus, Handschu cannot be minimized by 
                                                          
218 502 U.S. 367, 391 (1992). Staying above the constitutional floor 
means respecting the rights guaranteed by the First and Fourth Amendments 
but not providing any additional safeguards not mandated by the Constitution. 
See supra notes 120-37 (discussing the district court analysis of whether 
modification impermissibly sought the constitutional floor). If, without the 
oversight of the settlement, the NYPD returns to its past practices of 
investigating dissenters and minorities without suspicion of crime, the police 
run the risk of First and Fourth Amendment violations. 
219 Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (holding that the claim was barred 
as not justiciable and that military surveillance of the civilian population ought 
to be reviewed by the legislature). 
220 Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 18. 
221 481 U.S. 465, 472 (1987) (holding that government harm to a 
plaintiffs reputation is cognizable). A California State Senator wanted to 
exhibit Canadian films. Id. at 467. The films had been labeled “political 
propaganda” pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 22 
U.S.C. §§ 611-21 (1966), and the state senator contended that he was deterred 
from showing the films because it would have had a negative impact on his 
reputation. Id. at 473. The Court held that the state senator had standing 
because he had demonstrated that a government action—labeling the films 
propaganda—could have caused him a direct injury, distinct and palpable. Id. 
The Court ultimately held that the statute did not actually violate the state 
senator’s First Amendment rights. Id. at 484. 
222 Id. at 472. 
223 See, e.g., id.; Riggs v. City of Albuquerque, 916 F.2d 582, 585-86 
(10th Cir. 1990) (holding that the plaintiff class of lawyers, political activists 
and political organizations had standing to sue police for unconstitutional 
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reference to Laird.224 
Moreover, the defendants disingenuously disregarded the 
benefits that accrued to them when they claimed that no 
cognizable harm was established in Handschu.225 The litigants 
agreed to the consent order thereby avoiding long, drawn out 
litigation226 and, arguably, unflattering exposure of police 
misconduct. Furthermore, in addition to the harm caused by the 
chilling effect on the exercise of their constitutional rights, the 
Handschu plaintiffs also had argued that police use of informers, 
among other techniques, would have constituted harm.227 The 
absence of a conclusive judicial finding of harm does not prove a 
total absence of harm; settlement was simply an effective and 
expeditious means to end the litigation.228 
c. Compilation/Exchange of Data and Information Sharing 
The NYPD also complained that prohibiting collection of 
publicly available information “compel[led] the NYPD to 
                                                          
surveillance and maintenance of files since plaintiffs alleged that they were 
actual targets of the surveillance and the conduct of the police caused harm to 
their reputations). 
224 Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 349 F. Supp. 766, 770 (S.D.N.Y. 
1972) (recognizing that because the plaintiffs alleged a specific instance where 
the police conduct curtailed their exercise of First Amendment rights, the case 
was brought “beyond the pale” of Laird v. Tatum). 
225 See Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 18. The defendants cite 
Laird v. Tatum for the proposition that “the Constitution does not constrain 
government from collecting, retaining, and sharing information regarding 
lawful activity.” Id. 
226 Anderson, supra note 11, at 726 (explaining that “[s]ettlement through 
consent decrees holds numerous advantages over protracted litigation. 
Settlement avoids the time, expense and risk of trial”). See also Handschu v. 
Special Servs. Div., 605 F. Supp. 1384, 1398 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (recognizing 
that settling the litigation provided defendants the opportunity to reduce the 
publicity surrounding their actions that allegedly harmed plaintiffs). 
227 See Handschu, 349 F. Supp. at 768 (itemizing categories of harm from 
police action). 
228 See supra Part I.A (discussing the use of consent decrees in reform 
litigation). 
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virtually close its eyes to that which everyone but police officers 
can see, record, and reflect upon.”229 According to the 
defendants, the police must sit on their hands at public events 
while “[t]errorists take advantage of this lopsided state of affairs 
and safely use political events to advance their terrorist 
purposes.”230 Yet, defendants did not and presumably could not 
explain how “terrorist operatives” would use public events to 
further an illegal purpose.231 Moreover, the Handschu Settlement 
neither required the NYPD to ignore public information, as 
defendants stated,232 nor barred police attendance at public 
events.233 
Defendants also argued that the restriction on sharing 
information with other agencies made it impossible for the NYPD 
to participate in the international effort to fight terrorism.234 They 
claimed that the settlement affected a necessary partnership of 
local, state and federal law enforcement.235 If, however, another 
law enforcement agency requests information on a particular 
individual or group, the Handschu Settlement does nothing to 
prevent police from providing it.236 On the contrary, the plain 
                                                          
229 Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 14 (referring to the Handschu 
Settlement, supra note 65, § VI.A). 
230 Cohen Decl., supra note 115, at 16. 
231 See Cohen Decl., supra note 115, at 7-8. Deputy Commissioner 
Cohen does note that a confiscated terrorism manual teaches would-be 
terrorists to “attend public meetings to learn about major decisions and topics 
being discussed . . . to follow news[,] to keep track of tourist activity and 
arrival times of foreign tourist groups . . . and to note advertisements about 
new and used car lots which may be used in assassination, kidnapping, and 
overthrowing the government.” Id. 
232 Handschu Settlement, supra note 65, § VI.A (prohibiting maintenance 
of public information with the intelligence unit of the NYPD). The settlement 
does not require ignoring information from publicly available sources. Id. 
233 Handschu Settlement, supra note 65, § IV.B (allowing for police 
inquiry into a planned public event). 
234 See Cohen Decl., supra note 115, at 17-22 (noting that there are 
practical difficulties of forcing other agencies to comply with Handschu and 
asserting that the police have to be empowered to work with other agencies). 
235 Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 16-17. 
236 Handschu Settlement, supra note 65, § VII.A (requiring the other law 
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language of the settlement allows the sharing of information.237 It 
is also interesting to note that, until recently, the partnership the 
defendants appear to crave seemed to be moving in the opposite 
direction. For example, congressional legislation authorizes the 
federal government to sue local law enforcement for patterns and 
practices resulting in civil rights violations.238 The Department of 
Justice could include a pattern or practice of illegal and intrusive 
police surveillance and infiltration as a cognizable claim.239 
                                                          
enforcement entity or government agency to adhere to provisions on 
maintenance of information). 
237 See Lloyd C. Anderson, The Approval and Interpretation of Consent 
Decrees in Civil Rights Class Action Litigation, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 
632 (concluding that interpretation of contested language of consent orders 
ought to be accomplished by looking to the “grievance the decree was 
designed to cure”). This argument does not attempt to ascertain what is meant 
by “law enforcement agencies or government agencies conducting security 
clearance procedures” in section VII.A of the settlement and will assume the 
statement can be fairly read that other government and law enforcement 
agencies can legitimately obtain information collected by the NYPD pursuant 
to the settlement. 
238 42 U.S.C. § 14,141 (1994). 
It shall be unlawful conduct for any governmental authority, or any 
agent thereof, or any person acting on behalf of a governmental 
authority, to engage in a pattern or practice of conduct by law 
enforcement officers . . . that deprives persons of rights, privileges, 
or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States. 
Id. For detailed discussions of the potential use of § 14,141 to curb unlawful 
police activities, see Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of 
Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. R. 815 (1999) 
(discussing the possibility of consent decrees in the cities of Pittsburgh, Pa., 
and Steubenville, Ohio, to enjoin police abuses); Marshall Miller, Police 
Brutality, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (1998) (studying the legislative 
intent of the statute, how it can be used and what the Department of Justice 
would have to show to establish the pattern or practice and anticipating how 
the courts will react to suits based on alleged violations). But see Schlanger, 
supra note 13, at 2022 (pointing out that, given its history in prison reform 
litigation, the Department of Justice is hardly to be trusted to act as 
“trailblazer” for reform suits). 
239 Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 472 (1987) (recognizing that harm to 
a plaintiff’s reputation is an action of government that causes direct injury, 
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Unfortunately, current Department of Justice sentiments may 
limit this possibility.240 
Defendants correctly noted that the USA PATRIOT Act urges 
government agencies to share information.241 But, the sections of 
the USA PATRIOT Act cited by defendants largely encourage 
only further sharing of information gathered and shared under 
federal law in place before Handschu was settled.242 Thus, the 
                                                          
distinct and palpable, and is thus cognizable). Therefore, if police surveillance 
and infiltration causes a direct injury and a pattern and practice can be 
established, the Department of Justice could succeed in a suit against a local 
police department. See also Riggs v. City of Albuquerque, 916 F.2d 582, 585-
86 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding that plaintiff class of lawyers, political activists, 
and political organizations had standing to sue police for unconstitutional 
surveillance and maintenance of files since plaintiffs alleged that they were 
actual targets of the surveillance and the conduct of the police caused harm to 
their reputations); United States v. City of Philadelphia, 482 F. Supp. 1248 
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (dismissing for lack of standing a suit brought by federal 
government to enjoin the allegedly unconstitutional activities of the 
Philadelphia Police Department). The government’s standing problem in City 
of Philadelphia seems to have been cured by 42 U.SC. § 14,141. See 
Livingston, supra note 241, at 815 (recognizing that 42 U.S.C. § 14,141 
authorizes Department of Justice to sue police departments). 
240 See, e.g., Hearing on Anti-Terrorism Policy Before the Senate Jud. 
Comm., 106th Cong. (2001) (testimony of Attorney General John Ashcroft, 
stating, inter alia, that the Department of Justice was going to shift its focus 
from enforcing the nation’s laws to becoming an anti-terrorism outfit). See 
also Miller, supra note 238, at 178 (noting that because individuals do not 
have standing to sue under § 14,141, it will be incumbent on the Department 
of Justice to bring suit). 
241 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, at § 701 (2001) (USA PATRIOT Act) (codified in scattered sections of the 
U.S. Code) (expanding information sharing to facilitate federal-state-local law 
enforcement response related to terrorism). See Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra 
note 5, at 16-17, citing USA PATRIOT Act § 701. 
242 Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 17 (citing USA PATRIOT Act 
sections 701, 314). Section 701 amended a portion of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3796h (2003), by adding 
the words “terrorist conspiracies and activities” to a statute that authorized 
grant and contract making by the federal government with state and local law 
enforcement to share information related to crime. USA PATRIOT Act § 701. 
Section 314 encourages further cooperation among financial institutions, law 
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USA PATRIOT Act may not comprise a necessary change in law 
under Rufo.243 Because the law has not changed from the time of 
the settlement, the NYPD cannot successfully argue that the USA 
PATRIOT Act provisions permit modification.244 
                                                          
enforcement and others, revising the 1970 and 1982 enacted 31 U.S.C. § 5311 
(2003), which required sharing of information by financial institutions, law 
enforcement and regulatory agencies to facilitate criminal investigations. § 
5311. The argument that the USA PATRIOT Act’s express extension of the 
application of information sharing laws to terrorism investigations has only a 
slight practical effect on activities of law enforcement entities is a narrow one. 
Because of the ambiguities surrounding the definition of “terrorism,” it is 
difficult to see what more these new provisions do besides increase the 
possibility of abusive police practices. This note does not comment on the 
reach of the USA PATRIOT Act’s other provisions or on the cumulative 
radical effect of the Act in conjunction with other recent positions adopted by 
the government. For an examination of the cumulative effect, see Chisun Lee, 
Bracing for Bush’s War at Home, VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 26-Apr. 1, 2003, at 
56 (looking at recent government activity including the USA PATRIOT Act, 
the proposed Domestic Security Enhancement Act, and treatment of prisoners 
in the war on terror, that, taken together, paint a terrifying picture of the 
future of American liberty and democracy). 
243 Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 390 (1992) 
(acknowledging that a change in the law may require modification); see also 
Sys. Fed’n No. 91, Ry. Employees’ Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Wright, 364 U.S. 
642, 649 (1961) (recognizing a change in the law when congressional 
legislation was passed, authorizing union shops before such union shops were 
prohibited). 
244 Rufo, 502 U.S. at 390. It is true, as defendants noted, that the other 
entities must agree to the same restrictions in their management of the 
information. See Defs.’ Mem. of Law, supra note 5, at 16-17. But this should 
not be problematic for governmental agencies which routinely manage vast 
amounts of information. But see Ann Davis, FBI’s Post-Sept. 11 ‘Watch List’ 
Mutates, Acquires Life of Its Own, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2002, at A1 
(discussing the FBI list of people considered to be threats to the U.S. that was 
disseminated to the corporate world after September 11 and now is “lost”). 
The loss of the information and the subsequent problems are certainly 
regrettable. It could be argued, however, that a governmental inability to 
effectively share information due to bureaucratic inefficiency or fights over 
turf are a final safeguard against intrusions by government into our lives. 
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B. Potential Deleterious Results of Modifying Handschu 
Recent modification of a similar 1982 Chicago consent decree 
aptly illustrates the potential effects of modifying Handschu.245 
The settlement arising from Alliance to End Repression v. City of 
Chicago was recently modified.246 As in Handschu, the Chicago 
                                                          
245 Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 561 F. Supp. 537 
(N.D. Ill. 1982). The plaintiffs from Alliance were a class of Chicago 
residents that: 
engaged in lawful, political, religious, educational or social activities 
and who, as a result of these activities, have been . . . subjected to or 
threatened by alleged infiltration, physical or verbal coercion, 
photographic, electronic, or physical surveillance, summary 
punishment, harassment, or dossier collection, maintenance, and 
dissemination. 
Alliance, 561 F. Supp. at 540. The defendants conducting the activities 
regulated by the Chicago Settlement were the Chicago Police, the FBI, CIA 
and the Department of Defense. Id. The Chicago Settlement created 
restrictions on investigations of political actors, including prohibition on 
investigations that were solely based on protected First and Fourth 
Amendment activities. Id. at 560. The settlement also required periodic audits 
by independent public accounting firms. Id. at 568-69. 
246 237 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2001) (deciding that the with the Red 
Squads gone there was support to modify the settlement). This decision, from 
January 2001, reflected the Chicago police’s belief that the era of harassment 
of political actors, which stretched from the 1920s to the 1970s, had come to 
an end. Id. at 801. The court noted that the “core” of the decree, which 
forbade “investigations intended to interfere with or deter the exercise of the 
freedom of expression that the First Amendment protects, and requires . . . 
periodic audits,” remained, but “periphery” restrictions would be lifted. Id. at 
800. What Judge Posner considered the periphery of the decree, however, 
included the requirement of reasonable suspicion of possible criminal activity. 
Id. The Handschu Settlement and the Chicago Settlement have some minor 
differences. See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., No. 71 Civ. 2203, 2003 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2134 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 11, 2003) (recognizing a difference 
for the purpose of a modification seeking the constitutional floor, that the 
Chicago Settlement requires periodic independent audits); see also Chevigny, 
supra note 6, at 760-63. Judge Posner’s assertion that “advocacy of violence” 
does not raise a reasonable suspicion does not reflect the reality of the Chicago 
Settlement. Alliance, 561 F. Supp. at 563, 565 (establishing settlement and 
reasonable suspicion as showing Chicago police and the FBI have to make). 
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police argued that circumstances had changed to allow the 
modification of the settlement.247 In his decision granting 
modification, Judge Posner cited no actual changes that would 
warrant the modification, and argued simply: 
Today the concern, prudent and not paranoid, is with 
ideologically motivated terrorism. The City does not want 
to resurrect the Red Squad. It wants to be able to keep 
tabs on incipient terrorist groups. New groups of political 
extremists, believers in and advocates of violence, form 
daily around the world. If one forms in or migrates to 
Chicago, the decree renders the police helpless to do 
anything to protect the public against the day when the 
group decides to commit a terrorist act. Until the group 
goes beyond the advocacy of violence and begins 
preparatory actions that might create reasonable suspicion 
of imminent criminal activity, the hands of police are tied. 
And if the police have been forbidden to investigate until 
then, if the investigation cannot begin until the group is 
well on its way toward the commission of terrorist acts, 
the investigation may come too late to prevent the acts or 
to identify the perpetrators.248 
The Chicago police, perhaps in addition to the work fighting 
terrorism, recently initiated a new project.249 Under their renewed 
                                                          
The police under that settlement were rightly allowed to begin an investigation 
if they became aware of credible advocacy of violence. Id. 
247 Compare Alliance, 237 F.3d at 802 (noting a difference between 
circumstances surrounding the police harassment of political dissenters and 
current police action to deal with terrorism), with Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2134, at *27-28 (accepting defendants’ argument that the world was 
different after September 11). 
248 Alliance, 237 F.3d at 802. See also H.C. 5100/94, Public Committee 
Against Torture v. State of Israel, reprinted in SANFORD H. KADISH AND 
STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 827 (7th ed. 2001) (disposing, by the Supreme Court of the State 
of Israel, of an argument made by the Israeli government that the world is 
dangerous and that the “ticking time bomb” requires torture). 
249 See Main, supra note 176, at 6 (reporting that “anti-globalization” 
protesters in Chicago for a business conference would be taped, their photos 
saved to prepare for future protests, and their meetings infiltrated by police). 
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license to investigate lawful political activity, the Chicago police 
have targeted peace and social justice demonstrators.250 This 
indicates how the proposed modifications of the Handschu 
Settlement will likely be used in New York City.251 
                                                          
250 Id.; see also Paul Street, Empire Abroad, Repression at Home: Notes 
From Chicago, ZNET, http://www.zmag.org/znet.html (Nov. 8, 2002) 
(criticizing as hypocritical comments by the CEO of Boeing Corporation, a 
leading manufacturer of weapons, expressing his concern about the possibility 
of violence at protests of the business conference). 
251 At least one commentator has noted that police forces across the nation 
began re-instituting long-condemned practices prior to September 11. Abby 
Scher, The Crackdown on Dissent, THE NATION, Feb. 5, 2001, at 23 
(discussing police targeting of activists and demonstrators throughout 2000, 
including at the major political party conventions in Philadelphia and Los 
Angeles). The police rounded up hundreds of activists in “preemptive” arrests 
in Philadelphia, although charges against them were dismissed when police 
could offer no reason for the arrests. Id. Scher noted overt police surveillance 
of the type restricted by Handschu as well as “police raids of demonstrators’ 
gathering spaces . . . [, f]alse stories to the press . . . [, r]ounding up 
demonstrators on trumped-up charges . . . [, l]ist making . . . [, p]olitical 
profiling . . . [, u]nconstitutional bail amounts . . . [and b]rutal treatment.” Id. 
On the other hand, the use of police “debriefings” after the arrests of 
protesters and demonstrators has supposedly been curtailed. See William K. 
Rashbaum, Police Stop Collecting Data on Protesters’ Politics, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 10, 2003, at D1 (noting the practice, which had begun in February with 
the use of the “Demonstration Debriefing Form,” information from which had 
been loaded into a database, would end and the database destroyed). Civil 
liberties lawyers noted that calling these un-counseled interrogations 
“debriefings” did not remove them from the ambit of constitutional 
protections. Id. The police would not comment on the debriefing’s 
constitutionality but denied the separate contention that asking protesters what 
school they were from, what prior protests they had attended and their 
involvement in any organizations, violated either Handschu or the modified 
Handschu Settlement. Id. In response to this questioning, the Handschu 
plaintiffs moved (too late for consideration in this note) to incorporate the FBI 
Guidelines into the decree itself. See Tom Perrotta, Attorneys Seek to Codify 
Rule Against Police Questioning of Political Beliefs, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 18, 2003, 
at 1 (noting plaintiffs’ motion seeking to make the FBI Guidelines part of the 
decree was a response to the demonstrated “aim” of the NYPD’s modification 
motion: to harass dissenters). The modification order required that the NYPD 
include the FBI Guidelines in the patrol guide, but this created no enforceable 
rights. See Handschu v. Special Servs. Div., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3643, at 
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CONCLUSION 
New York City residents and the NYPD share a profound 
interest in deterring terrorist attacks on the city.252 Residents and 
citizens, however, also have an interest in protecting individual 
liberties in the face of government action and ensuring that 
government agents do not violate constitutional rights in the 
exercise of their authority.253 The current climate has heightened 
the interests of both parties. To understand why the police 
wanted to remove the Handschu safeguards, and the connection 
between Handschu and the current climate, the lessons of history 
must also be considered.254 Those lessons demonstrate that 
consolidation of government power and intimidation of dissenters 
is predictable in times of societal stress.255 When government 
                                                          
*11-12 (allowing the FBI ‘Reservation’ to be included in the patrol guide); 
supra Part II.B.2 (describing the court’s decision to modify). The reservation 
section makes clear that the FBI Guidelines are not part of the decree itself: 
These guidelines are set forth solely for the purpose of internal 
NYPD guidance. They are not intended to, do not, and may not be 
relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, 
enforceable at law by any party in any matter, civil or criminal, nor 
do they place any limitation on otherwise lawful investigative and 
litigative prerogatives of the NYPD or the City of New York. 
Handschu, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3643, at *11-12. 
 Thus the plaintiffs’ motion, if successful, would elevate the FBI 
Guidelines to a requirement imposed upon the police and enforceable through 
the court. See William K. Rashbaum, Civil Rights Lawyers Seek Teeth For 
Rules on Police Surveillance, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2003, at D3 (reporting 
that the plaintiffs are asking for a revision to the new Handschu guidelines that 
will allow for contempt proceedings against the NYPD if it violates the 
substance of the FBI Guidelines). 
252 See supra Part II.A (discussing reasons for defendant’s motion). 
253 The government shares this interest with citizens in that it needs to be 
perceived as legitimate. Government is seen as legitimate when it acts 
lawfully. 
254 See supra Part III.A-B (discussing predictable targeting of dissenters in 
stressful times). 
255 See supra Part III.A-B. Its ability to be successful in such measures 
may be based at least in part on how our fundamental freedoms are protected 
in other times. Id. 
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agencies argue that the nation’s vulnerability to terrorism 
requires the removal of restrictions on police, such arguments 
must be met with skepticism.256 The NYPD did not, and cannot, 
show that harassing dissenters reduces the threat of terrorism.257 
The worthy goal of preventing terrorist attacks is not furthered 
by removing safeguards to civil liberties. There was good sense 
in requiring the NYPD to establish criminal activities of political 
actors and obtain approval prior to investigating those political 
actors.258 The Handschu Settlement provided some assurance that 
the war on terrorism would not become a pretext for the NYPD 
to return to its past transgressions or further other illegitimate 
government ends. The settlement existed to ensure that police 
investigations do not trample on the rights of New Yorkers. 
 
                                                          
256 See supra notes 231-37 and accompanying text (discussing actions 
taken by Chicago police after similar restrictions were lifted on that city’s 
police force). 
257 See supra Part III (discussing defendant’s arguments for modifications 
and the court’s reason for granting modification). 
258 See supra Part II.A (discussing abusive government behaviors that 
provided the backdrop to the settlement). 
